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THESIS ABSTRACT
Urooj Amjad Mughal
Master of Arts
Department of International Studies
June 2013
Title: The Power Politics of Water Struggles: Local Resource Management in the West 
Bank
This thesis examines the significance of a micro-level approach to the Israeli-
Palestinian water conflict. By rethinking scale of analysis and examining local 
insecurities, Palestinian experiences reveal how water conflict  plays out in latent  and 
discursive ways. In a step-by-step method, I detail the processes and outcomes of the 
water struggle in the West Bank. First, I show how technical challenges ((i) poor water 
supply, (ii) antiquated water infrastructure, (iii) failed institutions) are shaped by 
political imperatives. Second, I show how Palestinians have responded to local water 
sector challenges: (iv) nonpayment to the Palestinian Water Authority  for their water 
supply, (v) increasing rural to urban migration by Palestinian farmers. As a result, 
Palestinian society  is stuck in cycles of crisis that make the conditions increasingly 
ungovernable. While Palestinians are stuck in a mode of ungovernability, their position 
in the peace process with Israel is undermined.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
 
 This thesis examines the significance of a micro-level approach to the Israeli-
Palestinian water conflict, one that is often overlooked in the Middle East water 
politics discourse. Local water management in the West Bank can serve as a lens 
through which to view Israeli-Palestinian relations. The technical challenges in the 
Palestinian water sector are, in reality, political. They require a local perspective. An 
examination of the effects that the water conflict has had on a local level reveals the 
influence of power on transboundary  water conflicts. Power and politics are not only 
abstract and romanticized forces. They manifest on the ground in ways that have 
tangible effects on human life. 
 In a step-by-step method, I detail the processes and outcomes of water struggle 
in the West Bank, an approach that is distinct from a normative and prescriptive 
analysis. First, I begin by examining Palestinian water struggles in the West Bank by 
talking with local water experts, to explore the ways in which politics have shaped 
issues of water resource availability  and antiquated water networks. The first concern 
among Palestinians is inadequate water supply. Second, while rehabilitation and 
maintenance of infrastructure may  address issues of water losses, political barriers 
continuously  impede any sustainable solution. Third, in order to address the challenges 
of developing Palestinian water resources, institutions were established through the 
Oslo peace process. They provided the Palestinians what  they were presumed to lack, 
control over their own resources (Palestinian Water Authority (PWA) and the Joint 
Water Committee (JWC)). However, due to the informal distributions of power and 
influence, politics in the water sector became increasingly impenetrable and complex. 
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Rather than each element (inefficient water supply, antiquated infrastructure, water 
institutions) positively  reinforcing the next, one element’s shortcomings reinforce the 
other’s. Therefore, technical failures in the Palestinian water sector are belied by 
political imperatives. 
 The institutions have allowed Israel to accumulate more control, while 
maintaining the fractious nature of the Palestinian water sector. The technical realities, 
as well as the compromised position of the PWA, have engendered a lack of 
confidence from local Palestinian communities. In a reaction to local water sector 
challenges, which their government has been unable to resolve, Palestinians have 
responded in two ways. Their highly politicized responses lead to steps four and five 
of this thesis. In the forth major step I show how the Palestinians have discontinued 
payment to the Palestinian Water Authority  (PWA) for their water supply. 
Consequently, the PWA is in debt to Mekorot, and in turn, to Israel. As a result, the 
unpaid Mekorot invoices are paid by Israel offsetting those charges against the value 
added tax (VAT) it collects on Palestinian imports. In the fifth step I show how rural to 
urban migration by  Palestinian farmers is exacerbating pressure on urban centers. Due 
to the inadequate water resources in the Jordan Valley, farmers are unable to sustain 
agrarian lifestyles.
	
 Palestinian nonpayment and rural to urban migration by farmers contributes to 
a cycle of crisis in Palestinian communities. With triggers at a local level, Palestinian 
responses have implications which contribute to conflict between Israel and the 
Palestinian Authority at a national level. Furthermore, because the frustrations 
continue to exist for Palestinians at the local level, nonpayment and migration are 
perpetual. As a result, Palestinian society plunges into a prolonged phase of 
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ungovernable conditions. I conclude this study by asking whether or not these cycles 
of crisis are accidental. While Palestinian society is stuck in a mode of 
ungovernability, the Palestinian position in the peace process with Israel is 
undermined. An unhelpful rhetoric prevails: “If the Palestinian’s are unable to govern 
themselves, how can they be equal partners to Israel in peace talks?”  This rhetoric is 
used time and time again to discount Palestinian rights in negotiations. 
	
 By rethinking the scale of analysis (from an interstate to intrastate level), local 
Palestinian experiences key into the power dynamics and reveal how water conflict 
plays out in latent and discursive ways. Technocratic approaches obscure the 
particularities of actual lived lives that are affected by these power dynamics. The 
discourse on water politics in the Middle East can be categorized in two ways. The 
first category claims that water leads to war; the second category looks to resolve 
water conflict by promoting peaceful cooperation. Although somewhat  of a caricature, 
Middle East water politics are subject to the standard themes of these two categories. 
In order to prevent armed conflict, mechanisms for cooperation are established at the 
interstate level. They include technical solutions such as transboundary  agreements or 
joint  cooperation initiatives between states that  are in conflict over water resources. 
Consequently, when the water struggle is rendered technical, it  is simultaneously 
rendered nonpolitical. 
 I depart  from the ideas that water struggle is characterized by  armed conflict  or 
peaceful cooperation. Such a framework contains a challenge to the status quo and 
leads to standardization of complex and essential realities. It ignores the role of power 
and how it plays out on the ground. For that reason, local insecurities are ignored. I 
intend to augment the current work being done to counter conventionally accepted 
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technical paradigms of water issues, by providing more insight into facts on the 
ground and crystalizing the power structures and relations surrounding governance and 
management of water in the West Bank. My research findings provide a descriptive 
rather than prescriptive account; a focus on processes; and, a deep view into the 
internal operations of the West Bank’s water sector.
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CHAPTER II
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
 Although there are cases of cooperation between riparian states in the Middle 
East through transboundary water agreements, the Israeli-Palestinian water conflict is 
unique due to the geopolitical circumstances within which it is embedded. It is most 
importantly  marked by the lack of domestic control over water resources within the 
Territories. Riparian states are given “riparian rights,” which is essentially  a water 
allocation scheme. These rights claim that a person or, in this case, a state that  owns 
land on, alongside, or crossed by  a natural watercourse has a legal right to access and 
use the water running through the property. But, because the West Bank currently does 
not have legal status in the international community, the water conflict is placed within 
a different geopolitical context. 
 The dominant body of literature regarding water issues in the Middle East 
relies on technocratic approaches to promote cooperation over transboundary  water 
resources . For technocrats, water diplomacy is a fundamental component to resolving 
water conflicts. It relies on technical and mechanical approaches, such as 
transboundary agreements and joint cooperation initiatives.1  However, these 
approaches are insufficient to explain the complexities of the Israeli-Palestine water 
conflict for two reasons: 1) they are state-centric; and, 2) they assume an actual or 
normative equality in power. Accordingly, the exploitation of nonstate actors is easily 
obscured. 
5
1 Mitrany, David qtd. in Selby, J. Water, Power and Politics in the Middle East: The Other Israeli-
Palestinian Conflict. New York: I B Tauris & Co, 2009, 54. See also: Wolf (1995); Medzini and Wolf 
(2004); Elhance (1999); Dellapenna (1995); Giordano, Giordano, and Wolf (2005).
 The influence of power affects those in subordinate positions, whose voices are 
obscured by a discourse that is interstate obsessed. The politics that shape power, in its 
various guises, are also manifest  in very real ways for the people who are subjected to 
them. For this reason, I emphasize the local experiences and challenges confronting 
Palestinians in the water sector. 
 Additionally, some liberal optimists such as Mitrany further argue for the “spill 
over” effect, in which cooperation between states over “low politics” fosters greater 
understanding and, in turn, cooperation in more “high political” areas of policy 
making.2 Miriam Lowi, though a realist, further contextualizes the approach, and says 
that  technical arrangements, which promote ongoing practical cooperation in issues of 
mutual concern, expect to blur animosities by virtue of a new perception of shared 
needs, eventually  leading to political cooperation.3  However, cooperation and joint 
management can exist only with a symmetry  of power and equality in rights. 
Cooperation and joint management also require a power balance in order for an 
equitable water allocation agreement to take place. The described top-down 
approaches are largely dependent on information that has been generated for 
instrumental or administrative purposes with technical or developmentalist  agendas. 
Such information is presumed to rise above politics. These conventional resources that 
Foucault referred to as “power knowledge” 4  obscure and gloss over complex but 
relevant divisive political issues and address water as an independent variable. While 
the shortcomings of “power knowledge” are not new, examination of how 
6
2 Hillel (1994); Sherman (1999); Dolatyar and Gray, Water Politics in the Middle East, (2000).
3 Lowi, Miriam R. Water and Power: The Politics of a Scarce Resource in the Jordan River Basin. 
Cambridge [England: Cambridge University Press, 1993, 194.
4 Foucault and Gordon (1980).
conventional resources influence the discussion of water struggles is still in its nascent 
stages.5  That knowledge which does exist, strikingly  tends to say very  little about 
power dynamics that govern the use of water resources, and how they influence local 
Palestinian water management. 
	
 In a world where statehood is deemed to be the highest form of political 
organization, the issue of water provision in the Middle East is usually assessed from a 
state level, through technical approaches. While this approach does help us to 
understand some issues, we must also incorporate more realistic conceptions of 
sovereignty  as we approach the subject. By interrogating the scale of analysis, the 
Israeli-Palestinian case shows that water conflict does not fit the state-based technical 
analytical framework. Although critiques of state-centric approaches are an old and 
persistent theme, they remain to be further explored in regards to this particular case so 
that  we can better understand how these approaches obscure the exploitation of 
nonstate actors. 
 James C. Scott aptly stated, “We are condemned to live with states, they are 
both our freedoms and unfreedoms.”6  In his work, he warns against the intellectual 
hubris rooted in technocratic approaches, which ignore the particularities of actual 
lived lives. The large scale attempts to resolve issues of water struggles, like those 
conducted by modern states, require the simplification and standardization of complex 
facts. Through this process essential knowledge is lost, because state processes 
simplify societies.7 
7
5 Zeitoun, Mark. Power and Water in the Middle East: The Hidden Politics of the Palestinian-Israeli 
Water Conflict. London: I.B. Tauris, 2008, 13; Selby, Jan. Water, Power and Politics in the Middle 
East. London: I.B. Tauris, 2003, 54. See also: Wester and Warner (2002); Lowi (1993). 
6 Scott, James C. Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have 
Failed. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998, 7.
7 Scott, 4.
 In recognition of Scott’s critique, I examine the issue of water conflict from the 
micro-level by looking at the empirical nature of experiences of those dependent  upon 
the water itself, in a direct way, whether it  be Palestinian water utilities or the 
Palestinian communities themselves. The needs of Palestinian communities on the 
ground are often lost  in the impersonal efforts of those asserting technical and 
scientific reasoning. While trying to break outside the “power knowledge” circuits that 
exist, I looked to those most intricately involved with the local water management, 
administration, control, and use in the West Bank. 
 If we begin the analysis of Palestine’s water circumstances by scaling down, 
we begin to understand how they  influence the situation at the state level, by way of 
explanatory and causal analysis. Technical solutions or joint management in the 
Israeli-Palestinian case have not worked because politics cannot  be removed from the 
water conflict. The water conflict  is not only  an issue of general water scarcity  in the 
region, which indeed is a factor; it is also an issue of Palestinian lack of sovereignty 
over water resources, due to the conditions resulting from the 1967 Israeli military 
occupation. Territorial conflict and water conflict are inextricably linked in this case, 
and an attempt to separate or address them separately  will lead only  to artificial 
solutions. 
 A micro-scale examination highlights the complexities of hydropolitics that  are 
tied up in state processes. It  also shows how the power dynamics materialize on the 
ground for Palestinian people. Therefore, water governance between Israel and 
Palestine must be recognized less as a technical issue than a political one.  One of my 
interviewees told me, an official from the Palestinian Water Authority  (PWA) told me, 
“There are two types of peace that the Palestinians struggle with: political and social.” 
8
“Social peace” refers to peace at a Palestinian society  level, which is their internal 
challenge. However, internal challenges have been constrained and limited by the lack 
of “political peace” between the two sides. The PWA official further asked, “The goal 
of government is to provide people with social services, so the question is: Can we do 
that  or not?” He went on to say, “Sure, I can do this, but first I must have political 
peace. We don’t even have the tools to give our people social peace when we are 
occupied.” Access to water must be a part of Palestinian sovereignty. His observation 
touched on a crucial point: that the internal issues can only begin to be addressed once 
Palestine has the autonomy to equally participate in the discourse. 
 The assumption, however, is not that a peace settlement can be a fix-all, and 
the PWA official confirmed that sentiment. He claimed that “[Political peace] will help 
because we can work to build strong institutions. Right  now our mandate is to do 
nothing. We have zero enforcement tools.” He went on to describe the PWA’s role as a 
“mere mediator” and said, “People ask us to solve their problems, but do we even have 
the power? And then, this creates more problems.”8 His ideas reflect  the opposite of 
what the liberal minded strategies for water cooperation promote. Cooperation over 
water resources cannot be achieved until both sides have reached a Final Status 
Agreement. Although in the current state of affairs a final agreement feels like a pipe 
dream, the point emphasizes that the water conflict is not an isolated phenomenon. 
Instead, there is interplay between the water struggle and issues, such as Palestinian 
refugees and Israel settlements, that  are central to the Israel-Palestinian conflict. 
Furthermore, the separation between “low politics” and “high politics” is an artificial 
one. On the contrary, all politics needs to be seen within the broader structural context. 
9
8 Najjar, Yousef. Fieldwork Interview. 9 July 2012. 
In fact, the latter approach reveals how power influences Palestinian realities in the 
water sector and the implications on relations between Israel and Palestine at  the 
national level. 
 Mostafa Dolatyar and Tim Gray, two frequently cited scholars on water politics 
in the Middle East, situate the discourse on water conflict into three main questions: 1) 
Has water scarcity  caused war in the past? 2) Will water scarcity  cause war in the 
future? 3) Will water diplomacy assist in negotiations? 9  This discourse is 
characteristic of the discussion that  surrounds a majority  of water struggles in which 
they  are identified through armed conflict or peaceful cooperation. The framework is 
problematic for two reasons: 1) It is a state-centric analysis that obscures the 
exploitation of nonstate actors; and, 2) technocracy  promotes water diplomacy through 
standardized systems and, therefore, overlooks the political territorial status quo of the 
West Bank. The power structures and relations surrounding governance and 
management of water in the West Bank create a unique situation because with the lack 
of Palestinian domestic control of water resources, issues of sovereignty and rights 
remain at the forefront. Although Dolatyar and Gray’s outline is something of a 
caricature, the discourse is nonetheless subject to its standard themes. Within this 
framework, the growing Palestinian social struggle for water access is largely 
unobservable. 
 The centrality of “war” is, also, much too narrow since it focuses largely on 
interstate hydropolitical relations. The absence of war does not mean the absence of 
conflict, which is evident after almost five decades of Israeli occupation and 
Palestinian loss of sovereignty over its water sector. By  putting emphasis on “war” as 
10
9 Dolatyar, M, and T S. Gray. "The Politics of Water Scarcity in the Middle East." Environmental 
Politics. 9 (2000): 65-88, 65.
an outcome of water tensions, latent forms of conflict are neglected. As a consequence, 
it is impossible to expose the power relations that are embedded in the dominant 
narratives. The 1967 War between Israel and its neighbors is a common point of 
reference for many scholars in this debate, who examine the role of water on 
conflict.10 
 Kathryn Furlong, a political geographer, refers to this as the “regimes” 
approach, arguing that this framework views exploitation as an interstate affair and 
neglects the people unrepresented within the states in question.11  Furlong shows that 
those who are subjugated to a state’s power, in a subordinate position, are left 
unattended. For water resources this is especially important because water conflict  in 
the context of structural power asymmetry is significantly  different than in 
circumstances of power equality.12  She rightly  points out that such analyses lead to 
mistheorizations of hegemonic structures at work and that assume that conflict is 
restricted to state competition. 
 Another foundational component of the water struggles discourse surrounds the 
idea of “water diplomacy” or “cooperation” between hostile riparians. The third 
question posed by Dolatyar and Gray asks if a solution to the Israel-Palestine peace 
process can move the peace process forward. Yet, their inquiry should be dissected 
into two parts: 1) Is cooperation over contested sources of water possible?; and, 2) If 
so, can it potentially catalyze the peace process? Dolatyar and Gray believe that 
11
10 See Hillel (1994); Kliot (1994); Shapland (1997); Sherman (1999); Sofer (1999); Wolf (1995); Naff 
and Matson (1984).
11 Furlong, K. "Hidden Theories, Troubled Waters: International Relations, the 'territorial Trap', and the 
Southern African Development Community's Transboundary Waters." Political Geography. 25.4 
(2006): 438-458, 442.
12 Warner, J.F, and Mark Zeitoun. "International Relations Theory and Water Do Mix: a Response to 
Furlong's Troubled Waters, Hydro-Hegemony and International Water Relations." Political Geography. 
27.7 (2008): 802-810, 805. 
“although water has sometimes provoked tensions, it  has much more often promoted 
co-existence and cooperation.”13  Furthermore, according to scholars like Mitrany, 
water diplomacy can “spill over.” The claim is that resolutions to water disputes can 
promote efforts at achieving wider peace objectives between otherwise hostile 
enemies.14  In fact, Dolatyar and Gray assert that the spillover effect has already 
occurred by saying, “Water scarcity has invariably  been a platform for cooperation in 
the region.”15 However, they  provide little evidence to support their argument. In the 
case that riparian disputes do generate agreements and treaties, John Agnew states that 
there should not be a presumption of equality  between contested parties in the capacity 
to affect  outcomes.16  In addition, he cites an emerging perspective on “hydro-
hegemony” which argues that much of what often goes for an “agreement” is in fact 
the outcome of clear power differentials.17
 Moreover, liberal optimists and technocrats contend that conflicts arise from 
misperceptions, inadequate knowledge, and poorly designed or undemocratic 
administrative and political structures. Jan Selby, British environmental security 
scholar, contends that in this light, cooperation flourishes when the technical measures 
are put into place, that is when institutions are appropriately  designed alongside 
development of corresponding pricing and tariff systems, when governments are 
democratic and accountable, and when decision making power is transferred from 
12
13 Dolatyar, Mostafa, and Tim Gray. Water Politics in the Middle East: A Context for Conflict or 
Co-Operation?New York: St. Martin's Press, 2000, 209.
14 Dolatyar and Gray, "The Politics of Water Scarcity in the Middle East," 65-88, 65, 84.
15 Dolatyar and Gray. Water Politics in the Middle East: A Context for Conflict or 
Co-Operation?, 209.
16 Agnew, John. "Waterpower: Politics and the Geography of Water Provision." Annals of the 
Association of American Geographers. 101.3 (2011): 463-476, 473.
17 Agnew, 463-476, 473.
politicians to expert “epistemic communities.”18  The notion of “epistemic 
communities” in water provision pervades the entire study  and practice of water 
politics. Although science rarely seems to resolve policy debates, Agnew reiterates that 
the claims to expert knowledge permeate disputes over many environmental issues, 
one of those being water. Objectivity, the determinant  character of scientific 
knowledge, creates an artificial separation between the policies implemented for water 
management and the power structures and politics that produce them. But  of course, as 
the essayist and scholar Nassim Taleb said, “The problem with experts is that they  do 
not know what they  do not know.”19  They do not know the values, desires, or 
objections of civil society. 
Interpreting Middle East Hydropolitical Knowledge
 In this section, I substantiate further the governing technocratic approaches 
through a discussion of some seminal works on water conflict in the Middle East. 
However, while the literature is broad on this enormous topic, I cite only a small 
fraction that I have chosen based in the 1990s, a significant turning point for water 
relations in the Middle East. John Anthony Allen, a longtime water analyst, called this 
time in water discourse history to be pivotal: 
 ! The 1990s have demonstrated that there has been a steady shift in awareness 
 and expectation concerning water, especially among the Jordan Basin 
 riparians. In both Jordan-Israel and Palestine-Israel negotiations, water was 
 seen as one of the major issues of contention. [...] In practice, water has 
13
18 Selby, 54; Lowi, 194.
19 Taleb, Nassim. The Black Swan: The Impact of the Highly Improbable. New York: Random House, 
2007, 147.
 moved into a much more negotiable mode than anticipated in the early 
 1990s.20
! The 1990s marked a historic turning point  for Arab-Israeli relations, 
particularly with regard to water: the Israeli-Jordanian peace treaty, which amounted to 
a detailed water agreement between the two sides; and the Oslo process between 
Israelis and Palestinians, which marked the first time that they  convened to discuss 
water rights. A great deal of seminal work emerged that sought to raise the profile of 
water issues in the Middle East alongside the peace talks, some of which include: 
Rivers of Eden: the Struggle for Water and the Quest for Peace in the Middle East 
(Hillel, 1994);  Rivers of Discord: International Water Disputes in the Middle East 
(Shapland, 1997); The Politics of Water in the Middle East: An Israeli Perspective on 
the Hydropolitical Aspects of the Conflict (Sherman, 1999); Rivers of Fire (Soffer, 
1999); Hydropolitics along the Jordan River: Scare Water and Its Impact on the Arab-
Israeli Conflict (Wolf, 1995); and Water Politics in the Middle East: A Context for 
Conflict or Co-Operation? (Dolatyar and Gray, 2000).  
 Daniel Hillel’s work is known mostly  for his profound assertion that “water 
can catalyze and lubricate the peace process... and soften the transition to regional 
cooperation.”21 His argument is similar to Dolatyar and Gray’s in that both agree that a 
dispute over water need not lead to violent conflict. Rather than foster a casus belli, it 
may  well serve as casus faci, an inducement to negotiate, a nonviolent resolution 
through compromise and cooperation.22  All three scholars state that a solution to the 
problem of water scarcity may  be achieved independent of a solution to the wider 
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problem of peace in the region.23  Sherman calls this “unfounded optimism and 
potentially hazardous naivety” rooted in the lack of comprehension of the structure of 
Arab states and its significance. Further, he says the idea of “peace” is deceptive as it 
can embrace two totally  antithetical ideas and political conditions. One infers a mutual 
harmony between states, and the second may be used in the sense of the absence of 
war.24  Just as the sense of “war” is too narrow of a determinant, “peace” is also a 
rather ambiguous concept.
 While Sherman’s dissection of “peace” is a worthwhile consideration, he is 
persistent in his admonitions that the next  war in the Middle East will be over water. 
He argues against Israel’s withdrawal from the territories occupied in 1967 and 
declares that Palestinians and other Arab states cannot be trusted to abide by water 
allocation agreements. Sherman asserts this point because his analysis says that  water 
resources must be secured at any cost and compromises over water are unacceptable to 
nondemocratic entities.25 In spite of that, the Palestinians could easily (and obviously) 
argue that their legitimate struggle has not found the capacity  to build democratic 
institutions. Furthermore, Sherman fails to pay any attention to the role that water 
allocation had in the Oslo process and the resulting disposition of Palestine. 
 However, an opposite and rather conciliatory tone, on par with earlier authors, 
is demonstrated by  Aaron Wolf’s ongoing research. He and some fellow scholars have 
compiled a Transboundary Freshwater Dispute Database (TFDD). It includes 
approximately  450 of the worlds water related treaties and illustrates international 
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water as a resource for cooperation.26  Furthermore, it provides a framework for 
quantitative, global-scale explorations of the relationship between freshwater resources 
and international cooperation and conflict.27 Three linked data sets are used in order to 
put forth water specific event data using GIS that mesh biophysical, political, and 
socioeconomic factors. Wolf claims that the weight of historic evidence shows that 
water could induce ever increasing cooperation between otherwise hostile riparians, in 
essence leading to peace talks.28  In a later publication, Wolf and Medzini suggest  what 
they  consider to be the most critical step towards conflict  resolution, which is 
separating concepts of territorial sovereignty and water security. This can be done 
most effectively by offering joint management, monitoring, and enforcement 
strategies, and sharing water data across boundaries.29
 This technical approach to water diplomacy  and cooperation has a few serious 
shortcomings. First, the rigidity  in allocational schemes and quantitative methods, 
which are most often central to transboundary  agreements, prevent the system from 
adjusting to natural changes or socioeconomic developments. Julie Trottier asserts that 
when a quantity of water “must” be received according to a treaty, nature is being 
asked to oblige.30  However, we can take it one step further and say, if a treaty is 
already an outcome of power differentials, the rigidity also prevents any challenge to 
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the status quo. Second, Wolf and other technocrats disregard the effects that 
securitization of water has on cooperation. When water is securitized, it is portrayed as 
an essential component to national security. As a result, water leaves the realm of what 
is negotiable, what can be the object of compromise. If allocations are changed within 
an agreement, it  is perceived as a threat to national security. This point is especially 
relevant in the case of water allocation between Israelis and Palestinians, where it 
remains securitized and closely  linked to concerns of territorial sovereignty within the 
present institutional setting and the present approach to water negations.31 
 In their writing, Wolf and Medzini claim that water sources were incidental 
conquests as Israel moved into various territories after the 1967 war and, moreover, 
that  it was only after the annexation of those areas that Israeli authorities understood 
the importance of corresponding water resources.32  While their claims hold true, it is 
of little relevance to discuss now, because water need not be the reason for conflict, 
but a reason to maintain it. As Murad Shaheen argues, “It is a contributing factor to 
Israel’s retention of land,” an idea that is reflected back to the state’s securitization of 
water.33
 Also, Wolf and Medzini put forward joint initiatives as a panacea for water 
conflict, which give priority to interstate hydropolitical relations, thus, feeding into the 
reification of states as fixed bonded spaces where state power is presumed to be fixed, 
an approach Agnew calls the “territorial trap.”34 However, power must be analyzed at 
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multiple scales. Israeli and Palestinian polities are sharply different from one another. 
Israel is an internationally recognized state that nationalized all water in the name of 
the public through its 1959 water law, and went on to built both physical infrastructure 
and institutions to implement that form of water governance. The Palestinian 
Authority, on the other hand, still lacks true independence vis-a-vis Israel in its 
preparation of legislation.35  It has been given only a weak institutional structure and 
limited resources as a result of the Oslo agreements. 
 The shortcomings of scientific knowledge are repeated in Wolf’s work. Jessica 
Budds, a political ecologist, notes, “Little attention has been paid to the production of 
hydrological data, their use in policy, and their role in changing waterscapes.”36  It  is 
illusory to assume that quantitative approaches are free of political influence. There 
are often competing numbers, and the ones which are referred to and cited are not 
selected on “objective” criteria. Numbers can be affected by tendencies to “group 
think,” varying interests, desires for particular outcomes, and so forth. 
 Arnon Soffer, a geographer from Haifa University  in Israel, provides the first 
attempt in this literature review to derail the “optimists.” Overall, he is pessimistic 
about the chances of peace due to the historical distrust that exists among Middle East 
riparians. But, he suddenly  abandons the issue of distrust  in his conclusion, where he 
falls back on the Malthusian approach, claiming that  the ultimate solution lies in 
addressing concerns of population growth.37  His ideas reduce the world to a place in 
which nature is static and unyielding, and human relationships to nature as 
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consumptive and exploitative. In regards to the Middle East’s water troubles, a 
naturalist discourse is exceedingly inadequate. As David Harvey points out, “To 
declare a state of eco-scarcity is in effect to say that we have not the will, wit or 
capacity  to change our state of knowledge, our social goals, cultural modes, and 
technological mixes, or our form of economy, and that we are powerless to modify 
either our material practices or ‘nature’ according to human requirements.”38
 Prescriptive approaches for cooperation, such as conservation and desalination, 
collection of better hydrological data, and altering agricultural water use, are still 
fashionable in the realm of water provision in the Middle East. But it is a dangerous 
assumption that nature and society  are both ontologically  separate from one another. 
The assumption makes it  seem as if power relations have no influence. It is not to deny 
that  interstate coordination in the Middle East over water issues has not occurred. 
However, the state-centric approaches turn a blind eye to local insecurities and deprive 
nonstate actors from access to the discourse and conversation. Additionally, while 
focusing on war as an outcome of water problems, we ignore the fact that  conflict 
plays out in discursive ways as well. As a result, initiatives are directed towards 
promoting water diplomacy  between states, which are characterized in technical terms. 
The problems are framed as if they were amenable to technical solutions. 
 Greg Shapland is the first  to acknowledge water rights and water entitlements. 
Otherwise, solutions for water conflict are restricted to issues of need. Shapland 
recognizes the significance that water rights will have on Israeli-Palestinian final status 
peace talks. As an observer in the multilateral peace talks on water following the Oslo 
Accords and head of the Working Group on Water Resources established during Oslo, 
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the equity  and compensatory principles which inspire Palestinian negotiators are 
discussed in his writing.39 
 The fact  that rights and entitlements are absent from this influential body of 
work encourages Israel’s “needs not rights” discourse. Mark Zeitoun, head of the 
London Water Research Group, describes two main features of this discourse that  were 
generated by  Israeli actors during Oslo, who advocated “needs” as the basis of 
cooperation with Palestinians: 1) an acceptance that there are legitimate domestic 
needs; and 2) a refusal to countenance Palestinian water rights.40  Eran Feitelson 
elaborates further on the Israeli consensus regarding water cooperation with 
Palestinians on a “needs not rights” basis. He remarks that even members in the Israeli 
legislature who “differ in Israeli-Palestinian issues can still form a coalition on water 
issues.”41  Such views were especially relevant during the 1990s, during the peak of the 
Oslo peace process. They are also reflected in the body of literature that I discuss in 
this section, which focuses on large scale technical schemes designed by modern 
states. The notion of “needs” simply  refers to water for Palestinian domestic use, not 
agricultural. Zeitoun states that this “needs not rights” discourse can be encapsulated 
as follows: “There is not enough water for all of us, so let’s not talk about water rights. 
Let’s cooperate to make the best  of the situation.”42 Such a framework precludes any 
discussion of inequitable distribution, therefore perpetuating an artificially conciliatory 
approach and establishing the status quo as a default position. 
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 The roles that water plays in shaping relations of power deserve special 
attention in the Israeli-Palestinian water conflict. Alex Loftus succinctly states that, 
“As water comes to embody and express social relations, its becomes just as crucial to 
the production and reproduction of power in the world.”43  Water and power are two 
mutually constitutive forces.
Methodology
 In striving to depart from a state-centric approach to the Israeli-Palestinian 
water conflict, I conducted 30 interviews with Palestinians involved in local water 
management in the West Bank during a five month period in the summer of 2012. In 
order to understand conditions at the micro-level, I visited four rural villages of the 
Jordan Valley  to interview members of local village councils and three cities, where I 
interviewed members of the municipalities. In addition to meeting with those directly 
involved in water distribution activities, I interviewed members of local organizations, 
including the Palestinian Hydrology Group  (PHG) and Applied Research Institute of 
Jerusalem (ARIJ), as well as academics involved in water politics from Hebrew 
University and BirZeit University. In the thesis, I use pseudonyms for a few 
informants, in order to maintain their confidentiality. Although they are from small 
communities and, therefore, easy  to distinguish, it provides them with some level of 
privacy. However, I use real names for the informants who were from local NGOs, 
local development organizations, and universities. 
 This was not  my  first time visiting the region; I went the prior summer when I 
expanded my knowledge of Arabic through a language program in Jerusalem and met 
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with local Palestinian organizations to gain a better understanding of the most pressing 
issues for Palestinian communities. During this time, I established a research assistant 
position with the Palestinian Hydrology Group, which hosted me in Ramallah the next 
summer. While assisting with local water projects, I also developed individual research 
goals. 
 There is an extensive body of literature dealing with issues of water allocation 
and water use between Israel and Palestine. However, there is a dearth of work that 
details the role of power in controlling water resources. In order to provide insight to 
the internal dynamics, I based the initial interviews of my study on a purposive 
sampling technique, where I sought out local Palestinian water management 
practitioners. From there the research developed based on advice from local experts 
and community members. 
 Heeding Bott’s methodological advice, I located a majority of my participants 
through local agencies and “entered” the field though a local organization that also 
hosted my research, the PHG.44  My goal was to establish credibility  in a variety  of 
Palestinian communities and to structure my relationships with people to include my 
role as a researcher. Therefore, I became a functioning participant in the PHG’s 
activities and often assisted by  drafting grants and data reports, while also using that 
time to visit the field with a local and trusted organization. However, “entrance” into 
communities, peoples homes, and different public spaces was not a one-time activity. 
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As Baca Zinn states, it is a constant process because potential informants had to be 
negotiated with and relationships established separately.45 
 I chose my case studies based on comparative criteria including locations that 
varied in political autonomy, their main source of income (industry or agriculture), and 
rural or urban lifestyles. The locations are illustrated in Figure 1. 
Figure 1: Case studies, map adapted from Applied Research Institute of Jerusalem.
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The first set of case studies were Area A autonomous regions of the West Bank: 
Ramallah, Jericho, and Rawabi, which are identified by a black font. The second set of 
cases studies included rural agricultural villages in the Jordan Valley, designated Area 
C, such as Bardala, Zbeidat, and Jiftlek, which are identified by a red front.
 The questions that were posed to each pertained to the reliability of water 
supply; water reliability; water infrastructure; willingness to pay; and, local 
community perceptions of the roles of various institutions involved in the Palestinian 
water sector. However, in most  cases I adjusted my data collection and interview 
questions according to the concerns identified by the participants in my study. 
 As my  fieldwork progressed, I became directly involved in the lives of my 
informants and prioritized building relationships based on mutual exchange and 
reciprocity. This was not a way  of furthering my research goals, but it  was “essential to 
alter the exploitative relationships which research imposes.”46  It also allowed me to 
move back and forth between gathering data and analyzing it, which helped to sharpen 
my understanding of the communities I was studying. Although it may be argued that 
my direct involvement with participants, mere presence, or selective perception 
equated with subjective distortion, I guarded against these biases by collecting 
information from a variety of sources and through triangulation.  Furthermore, I 
supplemented my interviews with observation, which is considered the best corrective 
because “each method reveals different aspects of empirical reality.”47
 Despite my attempts to create balanced and fair research relationships, their 
uneven nature became clear to me when I prepared to leave the field. While this ethical 
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dilemma is not unique for a fieldworker, researchers often do not speak of it. However, 
Baca Zinn distinctly  explores what it was like bringing her relationships in the field, to 
an end: “[they] were not exploitative, but they  were not equal. I created the 
relationships to specifically  carry out my  research [and] brought those to a close when 
my purposes were accomplished.”48 Since returning, I often find myself wondering if I 
am, after all, one of those researchers who does not  return to the community  because 
the research in completed. Though I hope that this is not the case, my worries bring 
home the fact that, “doing research is not a neutral encounter but a problematic, often 
painful human experience which changes the informant as well as the researcher.”49
Structure of Thesis
 Following the conceptual framing and methodology of this research, the 
succeeding chapters provide a historical context for the Israel-Palestinian water 
conflict, give a brief overview of the regional hydrology, and detail the governance 
structure of the West Bank’s water sector. In a subsequent section, I discuss challenges 
in Palestinian local water management in the West Bank. This portion is divided into 
two parts. Chapter 4 focuses on the technical and physical challenges at play in the 
water sector and show how they have been transformed by political and social 
production. I also discuss the institutions that resulted from the Oslo peace process, 
those that gave the Palestinians what they were assumed to be lacking: the Palestinian 
Water Authority  and the Joint Water Committee. This section explains the ways in 
which an inequitably structured treaty and inequitable coordination bodies 
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consequently  led to further fragmentation of the Palestinian water sector. Chapter 5 
details the implications that have resulted from the empirical accounts in the previous 
chapters. It  captures how the Palestinians have responded and reacted to the challenges 
in local water provision. In Chapter 6, the conclusion reflects on the impacts and 
consequences of the challenges that effect local water struggles. On a final note: While 
I have three main case studies, Ramallah, Jericho, and Palestinian villages in the 
Jordan Valley, I discuss Rawabi at length, only in 4. Due to the nature of Rawabi, the 
first planned city  in Palestine, its development remains to be seen because it is still 
under construction in the West Bank. Regardless, it provides a poignant example of 
struggles that lie in the West Bank’s foreseeable future. 
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CHAPTER III
EVOLUTION OF THE ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN WATER CONFLICT
 In this chapter I discuss the evolution of the water dispute between Israel and 
the West Bank territory within the context of the larger political conflict. First, in order 
to understand how the political culture surrounding water emerged, the founding 
ideological myths that underly  the Zionist project and Palestinian tradition must be 
incorporated into the larger discussion. The aim is to better understand the motivations 
of Israeli actions and Palestinian reactions in regards to their water policy upon 
settlement in the region of Palestine. Also, aspects of the psychological environment 
have, in one way or another, functioned as justification for Israeli and Palestinian 
behavior in regional hydrology.  Second, I discuss the role of water in the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict from the 1967 war to the present day and show how the occupation 
transferred control of water from Palestinian ownership to Israeli state ownership. Last 
in this chapter is a detailed outline of the West Bank’s water sector.
The Psychological Environment and Ethos of Water
 For the Israelis, water was important insofar as it was part of the “ideology of 
agriculture” in Zionist thought.1  “For those who make the desert bloom there is room 
for hundreds, thousands, and even millions," Israel's first prime minister, David Ben-
Gurion, wrote in 1954, when he moved to the Negev.2  However, it was the years 
before Israeli independence that  truly shaped poststatehood water policies and those 
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that  were imposed later in 1967, on the Territories. The quest for water always played 
a large role in the ideology of Zionism. It could be argued that the first Prime Minister 
was merely  following the traditional Judaic concepts of redemption that were so 
seriously engrained into the psyche of early  immigrants to Eretz Israel.3  One of those 
immigrants, Levi Eshkol, who would also eventually serve as a Prime Minister of 
Israel, referred to water as, “the blood flowing through the arteries of the nation.”4 The 
profound words of such Zionist leaders help to show that in Israel, water is more than 
just an economic commodity  or precious resource vital to its national security; it  is a 
precondition for achieving political goals in mind, and, for some, fulfilling religious 
prophecy.5
 Before 1948, the indigenous population of Palestine constituted a largely 
agrarian society that worked and lived off the land.6 In a traditional sense, agriculture 
was the principal form of sustenance and for that  reason, water was vital to the 
livelihood of a Palestinian. From those traditional ways of life, the Palestinians had 
ties to the land and viewed water as an extension of it. By the early 20th century, 
Zionist efforts to purchase land in Palestine lead to the gradual alienation of many 
Arab peasants from their land.7 For the Israelis, agriculture was connected to defense 
because land was a means to establish their presence. Because of this mindset, the 
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Arab community in Palestine sensed that their means of livelihood was being taken as 
well as their homeland. Consequently, the Israelis presented a double threat  to the 
Palestinian community. Both sides saw land and water issues as a zero-sum game, with 
each as the “other,” representing a threat  to their very existence.8 The concerns were 
aggravated by various pressures on water that also existed due to the increase in the 
region’s population and the demands of economic and agricultural development. It was 
also hoped, by  both sides, that the Jordan Valley, alongside the western side of the 
Jordan River, would eventually become a breadbasket for the kingdom due to its fertile 
land. For the Jordan Valley to be a productive region, irrigation water was necessary. 
As a result of Israel’s de facto annexation of the Jordan Valley, a professor in the 
environmental conflict resolution department at Hebrew University commented on the 
valley’s current condition. He argued that today, most Israelis perceive it to be, almost 
in its entirety, Israeli territory.9
 
Water within Politics
 In a hydropolitical context, the time between Israel’s independence in 1948 and 
the 1967 war is considered to be one of the most turbulent and chaotic periods in the 
history of the Israeli-Palestinian water conflict. It was a period characterized by rapid 
development on the Israeli side, minimal development on the Palestinian side, and 
clashing strategies to secure shares of the Jordan River system.10 Due to their lack of 
efforts in any  systematic development, the water extraction rates for the West Bank 
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and Gaza increased minimally under Jordanian and Egyptian rule, which existed until 
1967. However, since 1948, the newly established state of Israel embarked on a 
“hydraulic-driven national building exercise.”11 Eran Feitelson refers to this period as 
the “resource expropriation era,”12  during which the Zionist ideology  dictated Israel’s 
water development. 
 The tensions between Arab states and Israel were exacerbated with Israel’s 
completion of the National Water Carrier in 1964, seeing that it  was regarded as 
outright theft by  its Arab neighbors.13 Figure 2 illustrates the national water system at 
its inception. 
Figure 2: Israel’s National Water Carrier in 1964, map adapted from Fanack.
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In 1967, events conspired to bring war between Israel and its neighbors. After 
six days of war, Israel seized all of the Sinai and Gaza from Egypt, the West Bank, and 
all of Jerusalem from Jordan, and the Golan Heights from Syria. The outcome of the 
war radically  changed the region’s hydropolitical map and marked the beginning of the 
“Israeli Hegemony Era.”14  The conflict was now between the occupier and the 
occupied while no equality was pretended. Feitelson’s terminology touches on ideas of 
empire and domination, while also accentuating the importance of power relations 
between the two entities:15
 The outcome of the six-day war changed both the hydrostrategic 
 relationship of Israeli and her neighbors, and the power balance between them. 
 [...] This change in Israeli hydrostrategic situation and its evident military 
 superiority  effectively prevented the Arab side from challenging Israel’s water 
 plan or use.16
! The 1967 Israeli conquest of Palestinian land and its resources cannot be 
overemphasized. Counter to the previously tumultuous era, Israeli public interest 
regarding issues of water almost entirely  disappeared after the war. “As a result of the 
[1967 war],” Feitelson states, “Israel gained control over most of the contested water 
sources, and hence the perceived external threats to Israel’s water supply faded. 
Subsequently, water virtually disappeared from the public agenda.”17
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Confronting Water in an Israeli-Palestinian Peace Agreement: Oslo II
 As the period of political tensions continued, both sides were put under 
pressure from the international community to reach a settlement. In 1993, the Oslo 
Accords were signed between Yitzhak Rabin, Israel’s Prime Minister, and Yasser 
Arafat, the Palestine Liberation Organization’s chairman. This marked the first face-to-
face agreement made between the two sides that was intended to lead to a 
comprehensive peace treaty  and framework for future relations. A fundamental aspect 
of the agreement recognized final status issues: the extent of the territories to be ceded 
by Israel, the nature of the Palestinian entity  to be established, the future of the Israeli 
settlements and settlers, water rights, the resolution of the refugee problem and the 
status of Jerusalem.18 But, the final status issues were set aside to be discussed in final 
status peace talks.
 In 1995, the last of the Oslo negotiating sessions ended with an agreement 
signed in Taba, Egypt, referred to as “Oslo II” or Interim Agreement on the West Bank 
and the Gaza Strip. It built upon the foundation of the initial Oslo Accords. It 
solidified self-rule in various Palestinian areas. Insofar as it  relates to the Israeli-
Palestinian water conflict, Oslo II contains the most updated understanding on water 
that has been reached in the peace process framework. 
 Seeing that the Oslo Accords I and II were part of an interim agreement, the 
negotiation process was to be completed by May 1999. However, because the process 
was set  up without a specific outcome, it remained ambiguous and its promises did not 
come to fruition. Despite the death of the Oslo process and the shift  to unilateralism, 
some clauses of the agreement are still active. These include: 1) the geographical 
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designation of Areas A, B, and C; and 2) the functioning of the Joint  Water Committee 
(JWC), which professor Mark Zeitoun refers to as the “main discursive battleground of 
the water conflict.”19 
 The JWC and Palestinian Water authority  were outcomes of Article 40 from the 
Oslo II Agreement. It contained provisions on water and sewage that  recognized 
undefined Palestinian water rights, and returned some West  Bank water resources and 
services responsibility to the Palestinian Authority, an interim self-government body. 
Israeli officials refer to Article 40 as a turning point at which responsibility for the 
water sector was transferred to the Palestinian Authority.20 
 Mostly  importantly, Article 40 set forth governance arrangements for a five 
year interim period, notably with the JWC to oversee management of the underground 
aquifers, with decisions to be based on consensus between the two parties. The 
expectation was that the interim agreement would be revised within a five year period. 
However, it still governs the water sector today, seventeen years after Oslo and twelve 
years after the expected end of the interim agreement. 
 The stipulations which initiated the fragmentation of the West Bank and 
creations of the JWC, the administrative structure set up under the terms of Article 40, 
are also in practice. The archipelago solution divided the West Bank into territories, 
ascribing them a status depending on the nature of security control over them. Figure 3 
illustrates the administrative divisions as of 2000. It  functions as a gauge of Israeli vs. 
Palestinian control over territory. 
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 The distinct administrative divisions in the West Bank included Area A 
enclaves which were to have “full” (in fact, limited) Palestinian security and civil 
control; Area B had Israeli security  and Palestinian civil control; and Area C (the 
largest mass of land) was under full Israeli control. Most of the land area above the 
eastern basin of the mountain aquifer, in which Palestinian water projects are confined, 
lie in Area C. Area C constitutes 73 percent of the West Bank territory, and also 
includes all Jewish settlements. Israel is meant to retain full security authority for Area 
C, pending “final status” talks.
Figure 3: Fragmentation of the West Bank, map adapted from UNOCHA.
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 Several peace summits and proposals have been brought forth since Oslo, 
including the Camp David Summit (2000), Taba Summit (2001), the Road Map  for 
Peace (2003), the Arab Peace Initiative (2002 and 2007), and Annapolis Conference 
(2007). Despite the efforts of peace talks to broker a solution to the political conflict at 
large, the issues remain unresolved.
Context of Regional Hydrology
 Since the military occupation, Palestinian water policy  has been dictated by 
Israeli control, which has resulted in a shift of water distribution and allocation. The 
water bodies in contention between Palestine and Israel can be divided into two 
categories: 1) the main water resource, which includes surface waters of the Jordan 
River; and 2) aquifers, the groundwater sources, which are most  important and most 
contentious due to high demand and asymmetrical distribution. The Jordan River basin 
and the aquifers are shown in Figure 4; the former is illustrated by the solid tan, and 
the aquifers are almost entirely recharged beneath the West Bank territory and marked 
by arrows to show the direction of groundwater flow. The Jordan River is the main 
regional water resource and runs from its headwaters in the Golan Heights and 
Southern Lebanon to feed Lake Tiberias, the largest freshwater lake of the region, and 
terminates in the Dead Sea. Although it forms the eastern boundary of the West Bank 
territory, Palestinians are unable to extract any water from the river under the accords 
of the 1995 Oslo II agreement and are, therefore, almost entirely dependent on 
groundwater resources that are controlled, de facto, by Israel.21 
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 The Mountain Aquifer is divided into three main blocks as seen in Figure 5: an 
eastern block that lies almost  entirely under the West Bank; a northeastern block that 
originates in the West Bank but with springs in northern Israel that drain to the Jordan 
Valley; and a western block, by  far the largest, that originates in the West Bank with 
springs in Israel that drain to the Mediterranean. Because it underlies the highlands, 
much of the Mountain Aquifer can be exploited only by deep drilling.22  While the 
majority of groundwater resources in the region are replenished within Palestinian 
boundaries, the aquifers themselves are transboundary between Israel and Palestine.
Figure 4: Regional water resources, map adapted from American Association of 
Geographers: Center for Global Geography Education.
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 Furthermore, the water conflict is exacerbated by the natural features of the 
region: a dry  and desert terrain. Desert  covers 60% of Israel, 70% of Syria, 85% of 
Jordan, and 90% of Egypt.23  Drought-induced water scarcity  has further exacerbated 
the lack of access to adequate, safe, and clean water for the Palestinians.
Figure 5: Mountain Aquifer, map adapted from Palestinian Environmental Quality 
Authority.
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Military Orders 
 Following the 1967 War and occupation of the West Bank, through a new 
water development system and corresponding military  orders, Israel crafted the 
politicized space that exists today. The economic and infrastructural incorporation that 
occurred in the West Bank extended Israeli material presence throughout the territory. 
As a result, the selective channeling, distribution, and restriction on Palestinian use of 
water brought forth uneven levels of access. As well, Sharif el Musa notes, the military 
orders provided “such legal tools, that Israel did not need to declare formally that the 
water resources of the Palestinian Territories were state property, and it thus could 
avoid formally annexing them.”24
 As Israel took over the West Bank, it  immediately  replaced prewar Jordanian 
laws concerning the management of water resources with new Israeli ones.25 
Previously, a multilayer legal system existed in the Territories, made up of Ottoman, 
British, Jordanian (in the West Bank) and Egyptian (in Gaza) laws—the legacy of 
powers that had previously controlled the area.26  Water resources of the territories 
were also studied in detail by  the Israeli national water resource development 
company, Tahal, in order to facilitate Palestinian incorporation into the Israeli water 
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system. 27  On this basis, Israel pursued two simultaneous policies in the West Bank: 
limitations of Palestinian water resource development on the one hand, and expansion 
of Israeli water infrastructure on the other.28  In order to do the former, within just 
weeks of Israeli conquest of the West Bank, the army issued a series of military orders 
seizing control of water and land resources in the Territories.
 Military Order No. 92 of August 15, 1967, vested all powers defined under 
Jordanian Law dealing with water, in the hands of an Israeli Area Commander, a 
military  official. Henceforth, all water resources were put under Israeli control, along 
with the power to regulate existing water installations and the establishment of new 
installations. Complete discretionary authority  was given to the Israeli military such as 
building new wells and repairing old ones as well as determining the quantity and 
expenditure of abstracted water.29 As the extraction, transfer, and consumption was put 
under strict control, it led to severe Palestinian dependency on Israeli services. 
 In 1968, Military Order No. 158 was issued. It stated that: “No person is 
allowed to establish, own, or administer a water installation without  a new official 
permit.” It  suspended the drilling of any new wells in the Territories and introduced 
new license-based water laws. The order also gave the area’s commander absolute 
discretion over whether or not to issue the permits, the power to cancel or amend 
licenses, or make them subject to any conditions deemed fit. The military order also 
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stipulated that if any water installation or resource was built without a permit, it would 
be confiscated.30  These military orders are still in place today  and apply only to 
Palestinians of the West Bank, while settlers are subject to Israeli civil law. 
 The process for project approval from the Joint Water Committee (JWC) is 
extremely  complex and infused with bureaucratic obstructions that can delay or derail 
it. The Oslo II Interim Agreement in 1995 established the JWC. It provides the 
umbrella institution for joint management  of the West  Bank water resources. In 
accordance with the agreement, both Israel and the Palestinian Authority  (PA) are to 
have equal representation on the committee.31  From there, the JWC goes over the 
proposals to determine whether or not they will be approved and construction will 
begin. Since all of the projects must be approved through consensus, Israel retains veto 
power over any  Palestinian water development in the West  Bank. Theoretically, the 
PA also has veto power over any  Israeli water projects of the West Bank. But, since the 
water system for Jewish settlements is already established and in place, the proposals 
brought to the JWC are almost  nearly all Palestinian in origin.32  In this way, 
Palestinian power within the joint management framework is muted. 
 Further, two additional impediments make the process burdensome and 
gruelingly time consuming. First, permits are issued only  for very specific projects and 
are required for each stage of the project. Once a permit is issued to drill a well, others 
are needed to construct  the road to get the equipment to the site, and for a building to 
house the workers drilling the well. Each of the actions described is required to go 
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through a separate process. Later, separate permits are required for specific sections of 
the pipeline to supply each location receiving water from the well and for each 
pumping station and other facilities along the route.33  The second impediment in the 
process is that under the 1995 Oslo II agreement, new Palestinian water development 
projects, with the exception of one new well in the Northern West Bank, can utilize 
water only from the eastern basin of the mountain aquifer.34  Such a requirement 
presents great difficulties for the Palestinian Water Authority in its efforts to supply 
water to villages and towns situated long distances from existing or proposed 
Palestinian wells in the eastern aquifer.35 The result has been the drastic curtailment  of 
proprietary rights in regards to water that had been validly required under the pre-
Occupation legal regime.36 It is extremely difficult to obtain permits as they are mostly 
issued for emergency circumstances. 
 In December, following the occupation of the West Bank, Military  Order No. 
291 suspended Jordanian law with regard to private ownership  of water, declaring all 
water resources in the territory to be state property in conformity with Israeli water 
law.37  Additionally, it gave notice that all previous and existing settlements of water 
disputes and transactions were deemed no longer valid. Before the occupation, the 
water law that existed differed sharply  from that imposed by Israel. It  was initially 
considered a public resource, that allowed landowners to claim ownership rights to 
groundwater or springs or streams on their property. With the newly applied Israeli 
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law, water became centralized and the Israeli state was given power to allocate, 
license, ration, and regulate. 
 Core elements within the new Israeli policy included: 1) the prohibition of the 
drilling of new wells or the deepening or repair of wells without a permit; and 2) the 
metering of wells in order to enforce strict  quotas on Palestinian water utilization.38 
Israel’s justification for such policy in the West Bank was based on the need to protect 
the precarious water balance. Many Israelis who dictated the circumstances claimed 
their fear was centered on saltwater intrusion that had already occurred in the coastal 
aquifer, which lay along the coastal plain of the Mediterranean Sea.39   
 The new military  orders meant that Israel now controlled all water resources 
and transactions in the Territories. In addition, the occupation government required 
that  all Palestinian well owners install meters on their wells in order to monitor the 
abstraction rates to ensure that they did not exceed the set quotas.40 
 For the settler community, there was no adjustment being made to their water 
consumption. While the data on settlement water consumption is a closely guarded 
secret, it is safe to assume that settlers utilize between a quarter and a third of all the 
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water consumed in the West Bank, mostly for irrigation.41 In 1995, settlers numbering 
around 140,000 consumed about 50 million cubic meters (mcm), compared to the 
estimate of 125 mcm consumed by 1.2 million Palestinians.42  The water for the West 
Bank settlers comes from more than forty deep wells drilled since 1967 by Mekorot, 
Israel’s national water company, in the eastern basin of the Mountain Aquifer. 
Furthermore, consumption is encouraged even more by the heavily subsidized prices 
and water development assistance from the government of Israel and a variety  of 
Jewish organizations.43
Fragmentation of the West Bank
  To further exacerbate the problem, the fragmentation of Palestine and 
territorialization of Israel that came as a result of the Oslo Peace Process made it even 
more difficult for Palestinians to access groundwater resources. 
 The permit process in Area C of the West Bank is most burdensome and time-
consuming because it  is under both Israeli security and civil control. Projects that have 
already been approved on their technical merit  that  cross even a tiny  portion of Area C 
must get the concurrence of the Israel Civil Administration before the final approval of 
a permit from the JWC. Even in the civil administration, each permit for any  project in 
Area C must be signed off by each of the twelve different departments. According to 
officials from the PWA and local village councils in the Jordan Valley, this is the stage 
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where most projects run into difficulties and delays. They can easily be rejected for 
any number of reasons. For instance, a well or pipeline may  be too near a settlement or 
military  base and considered a security risk; the roads department may decide that it 
will result in the cutting down of too many  trees; or, the archaeological department 
may find it a danger to yet unexplored ancient sites.44
 From 1967 until the Oslo Accords in 1995, a twenty-eight year span of time, 
only twenty  new drilling permits were issued for domestic use, three for irrigation 
purposes, and fifteen for repairs. No permits were issued for drilling wells or repairing 
the existing ones in the eastern basin of the Mountain Aquifer, which is the basin 
providing the greatest supply to Palestinians. The permits that were granted took years 
from the time of request to the time of approval. As of 1990, Mekorot itself had drilled 
32 wells serving the West Bank settlements. Moreover, these reached much greater 
depths than Palestinian wells, leading to the average yield of 750,000 mcm/year for 
Mekorot wells as opposed to the average yield of 13,000 mcm/ year by Palestinian 
wells.45  Second, meters were placed on all wells in order to regulate water 
consumption by the Palestinians. The Israeli Water Commissioner set quotas on the 
amount that could be pumped and other restrictions such as bans on Palestinian use of 
water for farming after 4:00 p.m. were enacted.46
 Naff and Matson have noted that nearly  all the increase in Israeli water 
consumption since 1967 came as a result of its territorial gains.47  Nearly fifty percent 
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of its total groundwater and approximately  twenty-five percent of its sustainable 
annual water yield comes from the West Bank. The western basin of the Aquifer alone, 
because of its low salinity level, supplies over fifty percent of Israel’s drinking water.48 
Governance Structures of the West Bank Water Sector
 This section provides a detailed explanation of Palestinian and Israeli control 
over water resources in the West Bank. Israeli institutions control the abstraction and 
development of water resources within its political borders, and Palestinians, from 
2005 onwards and barring repeated Israeli military incursions, do so in Gaza.49 
However, the situation in the West Bank is extensively more complex.
 Sources controlled by Palestinian management structures include: 1) four 
Palestinian Water Authority wells of high abstraction capacity, developed following its 
creation; 2) agricultural wells, which were traditionally privately owned and regulated, 
and which now are under the jurisdiction of the PWA (there are over 300 of these wells 
throughout the West Bank, which were mostly dug before 1967 and are low capacity); 
and 3) municipality wells that are regulated and billed for primarily by municipalities, 
but also fall under purview of the PWA.50
 Israeli controlled resources include: West Bank Water Department (WBWD) 
wells, Israeli wells inside the West Bank, water purchased by the PWA from Israel, and 
water purchased by Palestinians in the West  Bank from Israeli settlers. The WBWD 
wells consist  of thirteen wells operated and maintained, but not  owned, by the 
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WBWD. They were originally formed as part of the Jordan Water Resources Authority 
in 1962. The WBWD was created in 1967, and was run until 1995, by  Israel’s Civil 
Administration. Between 1967 and 1995, several additional wells were drilled by  the 
Civil Administration to supply settlements and Palestinian villages. Since the creation 
of the PWA, the Water Department is institutionally under the PWA. However, the 
decisions and operations of the wells are dictated by the Civil Administration. 
Although Zeitoun’s research was conducted in 2006, my follow-up fieldwork verified 
that  although the water flow-switching valves continue to be literally  turned by 
Palestinian hands, the WBWD is in reality under Israeli command.51 
 Israeli wells in the West  Bank are owned by Mekorot, which distributes water 
to Israeli agricultural settlements in the Jordan Valley  and Israeli military bases. A 
small share of water is provided to the rural Palestinian areas in the Jordan Valley. 
Water that is purchased by the PWA from Israel is supplied through 25 connection 
points at the WBWD, also owned by Mekorot. The administration systems that 
established these connections resulted from Oslo II. As I mentioned earlier, the 
WBWD is operated by the Civil Administration and, as we see here, in conjunction 
with Mekorot. In this case, power makes a direct  impact on the consumer. Israel has 
threatened to cut  off water supply to Palestinian consumers due to deficient water 
payments, as was the case in Bethlehem in 2006.52
 The more than 200,000 Palestinians who are not connected to piped networks 
in the West Bank rely on rainwater that is collected during the winter months. When 
stocks run out in the summer, they  are compelled to purchase water from private 
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Palestinian water tankers, which if blocked from their routine filling points will fill up 
from Israeli settlements.53
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CHAPTER IV
UNPACKING THE WATER STRUGGLE:
OBSTACLES TO INTEGRATED WATER MANAGEMENT
 An overview of events regarding the water resources pictured, following 1967, 
make clear the asymmetry of power. Yet, the influence of power in transboundary 
water conflicts has not been systematically  conceptualized. Wester and Warner 
illustrate this point when they boldly ask readers to question the received wisdom of 
river basin management.1  They  argue that getting stuck in the conventional technical 
paradigms tends to defang serious water issues of their political component, and in 
effect reinforces existing power inequalities.2 
 This chapter shows how power has given form to challenges in the water sector 
that  are otherwise approached in a prescriptive and mechanical fashion.  There are 
three obstacles to a consolidated regional model for Palestinian water distribution in 
the West Bank: (1) inadequate Palestinian water supply; (2) antiquated Palestinian 
water infrastructure; and, (3) the inability of the Palestinian Water Authority (PWA) to 
conduct integrated management of the resources within the current  governance 
framework. As a consequence, failures of water resources development and 
management have contributed to low and declining per capita water resource 
availability  for the Palestinians. By way of explanatory and causal analysis, each 
chapter links the issues from the micro-level, those internal to the Palestinian water 
sector, to issues at the national level. 
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The Technical Is Political: Challenges to Palestinian Water Supply
 Water supply management in the West Bank falls within the responsibility  of 
water utilities, local municipal and village councils, as well as the West Bank Water 
Department (WBWD).3 These institutions take charge of coordinating the Palestinian 
water needs, which in most cases requires water purchase from Mekorot, Israel’s 
national water carrier. The Palestinian regulatory body is the Palestinian Water 
Authority (PWA), under which all water management operations are conducted.4  In 
theory, the PWA has a mandate over water and sanitation management in the West 
Bank. Regardless of the framework that emerged following the 1995 Interim 
Agreement, the PWA is marginalized by the “real water authority” in the West Bank 
which is embodied by the Joint Water Committee (JWC) as well as Israeli military 
control. 
 As we have seen, after 1967 Israel took control of the water resources and 
developed wells throughout the West  Bank, and developed a water supply network 
serving the settlements that linked into Mekorot. Today, almost eighteen years after 
Oslo II, Israel has taken control of water distribution to the Palestinians, with over 
three quarters of their water now supplied by Mekorot.5 
 An official from the PWA explained how Israeli control over water developed 
and Palestinian resources were seized: 
 “The [Israelis] are providing a supply, but our resources that we were 
 using,  the wells and springs, they dried up due to the Israeli sources 
 nearby, which lowered our water table. We lost those resources.”6 
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! Well drilling was carried out by  Israelis in the West Bank in close proximity to 
local Palestinian wells or springs. The result  marked a decline in the output of 
Palestinian resources, which resulted in a lowering of the water level. Due to the 
superior technology available to Mekorot, it drills deep  wells after extensive 
geological surveying, in contrast to Palestinians, who drill shallower wells in 
convenient locations. The deeper the well and more geologically  sound its location, the 
more abundant its water supply and the better equipped it is to resist contamination, 
saltwater intrusion, and the harsh effects of drought. Also, if two wells are located in 
close proximity to one another, the deeper one abstracts more water than the shallow 
one.7
 Alongside the loss of Palestinian control upon local water resources, Israeli 
presence steadily increased in the West  Bank through its settlements, military  zones, 
and other various areas designated as C. The Israeli areas fell outside the jurisdiction 
of the Palestinian Authority  (PA) as assigned by Oslo II, which further impeded the 
Palestinian Water Authority’s ability to develop a fully  integrated water network in the 
West Bank. The independent means for Palestinian water supply were replaced by 
Mekorot, increasing the West Bank’s dependency on an external source. 
 The failure to develop new water resources has led to chronic Palestinian 
supply  shortages. As a result, Mekorot is increasingly important to Palestinian water 
access. In 2008, Mekorot  supplied 22.3 mcm of water, 19.2 mcm more than that 
Article 40 commitment of 3.1 mcm. The idea was that 3.1 mcm would be provided by 
Israel, while the remaining water resources would be developed by the PWA and other 
Palestinian water institutions. Although water supply  through the Israeli carrier 
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increased to the Palestinians, it was at the cost of losing Palestinian owned wells and 
springs. This was exactly the opposite of the Palestinian aspiration for more water 
autonomy and self-sufficiency, as was hoped for in the Oslo II agreement. However, 
the increased allocation from Mekorot shows that the West Bank “increase” in water 
supply  was at  the cost of Palestinian control over resources, and not the product of an 
increase in their actual consumption.
 In this chapter, the case studies illustrate the various ways that Palestinian 
sovereignty  has been compromised as a result of Israeli control over water resources in 
the West Bank. I organize the case studies according to their degree of Palestinian 
political autonomy. First, Ramallah Al-Bireh is juxtaposed to the situation in Jericho, 
both of which are in Area A. Next, I present  issues that confront the Jordan Valley 
villages, which lie in Area C. Third, the challenges confronted by developers in 
Rawabi, the first Palestinian planned city, highlight how the lack of autonomy over 
water resources will present future challenges to the West Bank’s development. 
The Jerusalem Water Undertaking: Water Provision in Ramallah and Al-Bireh
 “We do not have enough of our own resources and the quantitates from Mekorot 
cannot be changed easily. We have been getting the same supply for five years, but our 
population is growing. If we want to change that, it means grueling long negotiations 
in the Joint Water Committee” 8
-Jerusalem Water Undertaking official, July 7th, 2012.
 The Jerusalem Water Undertaking (JWU) is one of two water suppliers in the 
West Bank to have legal status an as autonomous utility. It provides services to the 
Ramallah and Al-Bireh districts and operates five Palestinian wells, although most of 
the JWU’s water, about 85%, comes from Israel, illustrating the JWU’s dependence on 
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Israel for its water supply and consequent vulnerability. It underlines the need for 
water supply and increased Palestinian authority in regards to its management. The 
utility faces three key challenges: 1) the risks of dependence on Israel in terms of 
vulnerability  to Israel’s decisions and interventions; 2) the impossibility of planning 
rationally  when the local Palestinian company, as well as the PWA, control neither the 
land (outside its district) nor the water; and, 3) the higher financial cost and 
commercial risk of having always to work with the Israeli administration.9
 The JWU is a microcosmic example of how the availability and control of 
water resources are fundamental problems in the Palestinian water sector in the West 
Bank. Availability  is low due to strict controls on quotas and consumption of water. 
The Palestinian residents in the Ramallah and Al-Bireh districts depend on the water 
that  Mekorot extracts from the Mountain Aquifer and provides through the West Bank 
Water Department (WBWD). Then, the JWU makes a purchase from the WBWD. 
However, when supply  from the JWU’s five local wells and Mekorot is insufficient to 
meet the area’s needs, locals must purchase water from private tankers. The cost of the 
private tankers includes the tank itself, pumping, and transportation. Due to the 
hundreds of temporary  or permanent Israeli checkpoints and cantonization of West 
Bank territory, tanks must make long circuitous journeys to reach Palestinian areas, 
which increase the costs of transportation. 
 According to Zeitoun, when access to Palestinian water sources is barred by  
physical obstructions, the tankers purchase water from obliging Israeli settlers. The 
settlers making the deals sell water provided to them at a subsidized cost from the 
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Israeli government.10 This means that  1 cubic meter of water via tanker costs NIS 20, 
as opposed to what it costs an Israeli in the West Bank territory, which is NIS 5.11  The 
irony is not lost.
	
 According to the political classification system in the West Bank, Ramallah and 
Al-Bireh are autonomous Palestinian areas, free from Israeli military control. But, the 
JWU is still presented with difficulties in regards to its water supply. The utility has 
autonomy over five of its wells, which constitute less than a quarter of its water supply. 
The remainder comes from Mekorot, and the supply has not been adjusted since Oslo, 
which is needed in order to address the increasing needs of a growing population. 
	
 The next case study, Jericho, is also an Area A municipality. However, it varies 
slightly from Ramallah and Al-Bireh because it has its own independent water 
resource that supplies most of the city, with the exception of one refugee camp that 
relies on Mekorot. Like Ramallah, Jericho struggles to develop its water resources 
even though its primary supplier is not Mekorot. However, Israel’s control manifests 
differently in Jericho because the city is not dependent on Mekorot.  Instead, the 
policies of occupation prevent Jericho from physically expanding according to its 
needs. Instead of growing, Jericho is “swelling,” which is in effect putting pressure on 
the current water services and infrastructure. 
The City of Jericho
 “Jericho is an Island.” -Head of Jericho’s Water Network Department. 
August 1st, 2012.
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 In 1994, Jericho, like Ramallah, became an Area A municipality. The city has 
its own water resource to the north of the city, the Ein Al Sultan Spring, which is the 
largest spring in the area. It is the least dependent on Mekorot for water compared to 
other regions in the West Bank. The spring is known to have provided the greatest and 
most constant supply of potable water to the city for decades.
	
 Since Jericho has also been self-governed for over a decade, in theory it could 
serve as an example of future Palestinian administration of water resource 
management. However, theory differs from practice in fundamental ways. While 
Jericho is a Palestinian controlled municipality, it is still operating within the larger 
context of Israeli military control and is faced with the same constraints as other Israeli 
controlled areas. Unlike an Israeli municipality operating within Israel proper, Jericho 
faces considerable challenges in its water infrastructure and distribution system.          
The head of Jericho’s water network department highlighted the key obstacle 
for the city: “It is only natural for cities to grow, but here, we are stuck.”12  His point 
reflects the idea that  the city  is an “island” due to its geopolitical setting. It  is 
surrounded entirely by Area C, which remains under complete Israeli security and civil 
jurisdiction. Due to the city’s unique social and historical characteristics, the water 
supply is already facing additional pressure. Compounded with the inability to grow 
and expand due to military restrictions, Jericho faces problems in developing its water 
sector to meet growing needs. The city requires physical space in order to develop 
itself in response to the demand. In the shaded area of Figure 6, Jericho’s boundaries 
are illustrated as well as the surrounding Israeli administered Area C.
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 Therefore, in addition to challenges of infrastructure, there is the literal 
inability  of Jericho to take part in any type of “state building activity.” The physical 
restrictions on Jericho’s growth are not solely  a result of geography, but  are due to the 
political-structural issues that are experienced elsewhere in the West Bank as well. 
Although it is in the city’s benefit  not to rely  on Mekorot for water, it  needs both 
infrastructure and an increased water supply in order to develop. Without the former, 
Jericho cannot inquire into the abstraction potential of its local resource. ts local 
resource.    
Figure 6: Palestinian autonomous area - Jericho, map adapted from Foundation for 
Middle East Peace.                                         
	
 Jericho is one of the oldest continuously inhabited cities in the world, which 
gives it a unique character. Accordingly it has a large number of historical, ancient, 
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religious, and natural sites, which make it a regional center for tourism.13 Moreover, 
industry has continually increased since the 2nd Intifada because regional security  has 
improved.14  Several other factors have put a pressure on Jericho’s water supply, 
including: 1) the extensive use of wet cooling systems or water based air conditioning; 
2) widespread agricultural activity; 3) increased domestic use of water at  the 
household level; and, 4) the spread of swimming pools, especially  those owned by 
partially  residing property  owners (mainly from Jerusalem).15  Those who looked to 
build their second homes in Jericho claimed that, due to its political autonomy, it  was 
easier to build there than in other areas of the West Bank, where permission must be 
granted by Israel. “Building” in this context is not to be confused with building of 
water related infrastructure, the latter requiring an infinitely longer process. The city’s 
temperate winter climate is another incentive for those coming to Jericho rather than to 
other West Bank cities.16  The municipality’s water department mentioned that the 
Palestinian Authority training and security center also increased the city’s consumption 
rates.17 
 Jericho’s climate is another significant influence on the city’s water 
consumption. The municipality acknowledged that the culture of consumption is 
generally higher than in other areas of the West Bank, because temperatures rise much 
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higher in the city  than in any other Palestinian governorate.18  For centuries, weather 
conditions have influenced people’s water practices in the area, resulting in much 
higher water usage for hygiene and cooling purposes. Tourism, local agriculture, and 
Palestinians who come to Jericho to build their second homes, are additional 
contributing factors to the culture of consumption. In a Master Plan Draft for Jericho, 
the Palestinian Hydrology Group, a local water NGO, is careful not to point blame for 
high consumption solely on the population’s consumption patterns: 
 These water practices cannot entirely be considered  as reckless behavior since 
 the extremely elevated temperatures do in fact require much higher use of 
 water to sustain a healthy life.19
 The issue, then, is: How must the Jericho Municipality  address these 
consumption issues? As it  is right  now, the water supply  is not functioning 24/7 
because it is not enough to meet the continuous needs of Jericho’s residents. The 
municipality has devised a scheduling system for distribution: some residents are 
supplied at night for twelve hours and others are supplied during the day for twelve 
hours.20  In order to deal with the water cutoffs, a majority  of Jericho’s residents invest 
in roof-top cisterns to store water (illustrated in Figure 7). 
 The cutoffs occur due to pressure on Jericho’s water demand, but also due to 
poor infrastructure and lack of development in the water sector. When asked about the 
distribution problems in Jericho, the municipality  corrected the claims and cited that 
controlling consumption must be their number one priority  for the water sector, 
because rehabilitating its distribution system was subject to Israeli policies, which 
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could take months or years to put into practice.21  Whether a distribution or 
consumption issue, Jericho needs the space to physically  expand so that it can develop 
its water network and increase it supply efficiency.
Figure 7: Rooftop tanks in Jericho city, photo by author. 
 Due to increasing demands on water, reforming water allocation would require 
the development and expansion of the water network and the city  itself. If 
consumption growth continues and Jericho is stuck within its Oslo designated 
boundaries, it  is unlikely that engineering solutions will be able to address issues in the 
future. As the head of the municipality’s water sector explained, “Just  because we have 
more autonomy over our resources doesn’t mean we have more water.”22  More water 
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in Jericho would require it  to have authority  over its city  planning and development 
projects.
 The problems of demand in Jericho cannot be addressed in a vacuum. With the 
influence of Israeli control on the Palestinian water sector, Jericho is dependent  on the 
guidelines put forth by Israeli authorities for its development. While it is “only  natural 
for a city to grow,” it cannot do so without the ability  to provide appropriate social 
services. Jericho’s autonomy is superficial until it can independently make policy 
decisions and implement them accordingly. 
 Although the first two case studies are situated in Area A, Ramallah’s 
autonomy comes into question due to its dependency on Mekorot  for its water supply; 
and Jericho’s autonomy is also challenged due to its inability to increase efficiency and 
augment water supplies. Heavy influence from Israeli authorities would be expected in 
the Jordan Valley, which is entirely under the control of the Civil Administration. 
However, Israeli control manifests itself in various ways, in all areas of the West  Bank, 
regardless of their political ascription. In the Jordan Valley, all Palestinian issues 
pertaining to water resources and development must also refer to the Civil 
Administration, in addition to the Joint Water Committee. Area A is only required to 
refer to the Joint  Water Committee. Both institutions involve extremely complex 
processes infused with bureaucratic obstructions. Palestinian villages in the Jordan 
Valley also illustrate how the issues of water supply are less technical than they are 
political.
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The Jordan Valley
“The local village council’s role is to give services, as a part of the Palestinian 
Authority and PWA, but everything is under Israeli control. [If we want to give 
services] no one can do anything. If Israelis accept to let us do something, then we will 
do it. Otherwise, we will not have anything. This is the life. We must adapt to this. 
Between you and me, we have to find a way to drink what we have. 
Even if we know this, it’s not enough”
- The Head of Zbeidat’s Local Village Council. July 24th, 2012.
	
 Village councils are local government bodies used by the Palestinian Authority  
in the Jordan Valley. They have approximately three to eleven members, with the 
Chairman as the head of the council. 
 The quote above reflects the impacts of restrictions on Palestinian water supply 
that  are imposed on a majority of the Jordan Valley. Aside from the portions of land 
which include Palestinian homes and classify as Area B, the Jordan Valley is 
categorized as a restricted military  zone in Area C, subject to Israel’s complete 
authority. Area C also includes Palestinian agricultural land, which is closely 
monitored and ascribed strict policies by the Civil Administration. 
 The Village council, although set up as a local regulatory  body, has no 
influence on the decisions regarding water resources, which are supplied entirely  by 
Israel at the West Bank Water Department level. There is one pipe from the main 
Mekorot well in the area that supplies Zbeidat and two other nearby villages. From 
that  same well, there is a separate pipe for the Israeli settlement, Argaman. The 
Palestinian communities have a population of approximately  3400 residents and 
Argaman houses approximately  166 residents. Figures 8 and 9 illustrate the two pipes: 
the first photo shows a pipe going to three Palestinian villages (Marj Ghazal, Zubeidat, 
and Marj Na’jeh); the second photo shows a pipe going to the Argaman settlement. 
Water supply for both communities originates at the same Israeli well. 
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 The two pictures show one way  in which distribution and supply are greatly  
different for the two groups. For a community of 166 residents, the water 
infrastructure consists of a modernly  constructed pipe with a diameter of 
approximately  10 centimeters, placed within a protective wire barrier. For the three 
Palestinian communities, the pipe is significantly older and the diameter is 
significantly  smaller, approximately 4 centimeters. The wider the pipe, the greater the 
water quantity and pressure being pumped through. For two populations that  are very 
different in size, Argaman’s pipe is more than double in size than that  of the 
Palestinian villages.
Figure 8: Pipe to Palestinian villages, photo by author. 
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Figure 9: Pipe to Argaman, Israeli settlement, photo by author.
 Alongside strict consumption quotas and compromised water pressure, the way 
that  water distribution is designed creates an inequitable supply of water between the 
Palestinian villages. Marj Ghazal, the first Palestinian village, is consuming the 
greatest amount of water because it  lies first along the distribution line. The last 
village, Marj Na’jeh is barely receiving any water from the Mekorot connection 
because by the time water crosses through the first two villages, the quota assigned by 
Israel has already been met. The director of the Institute of Environmental and Water 
Studies (IEWS) at  BirZeit  University  called this situation, typical in rural areas of the 
West Bank, the “soccer field analogy.”23 The idea is that the closer the water consumer 
is to the main source of supply, the higher the water pressure and quantity  of water 
available. However, due to physical losses from the poorly developed water 
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infrastructure, combined with the inadequately designed pipes, pressure and supply are 
further affected. The supply is already  low compared to the demand and compounded 
with unmaintained infrastructure and poor distribution schemes, making water 
availability to the Palestinian villages severely compromised.24
Figure 10: “Soccer field” water distribution.
 Figure 10 illustrates the way in which water supply is distributed through the 
three villages. The sizes of the triangles correspond to the amount of water being 
consumed by each Palestinian village. Marj Ghazal receives the highest pressure and 
largest supply compared to Zbeidat and Marj Na’jeh. The black arrow marks the pipe 
going to Argaman. In some cases, rooftop cisterns are used to store the water coming 
from the pipes to create a gravity water system, in order to address the problem of 
inadequate pressure. If the source of water is at  a higher elevation than it  used to be, 
supply  by gravity increases the pressure in its supply. However, cisterns are rare in the 
Jordan Valley. Given their expense and the transportation costs of reaching distant 
rural villages, many  Palestinians in the region cannot afford to create these systems on 
a large scale. Access to and from villages in the Jordan Valley  is highly constrained, 
with almost six access routes controlled by Israeli checkpoints. According to UN-
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OCHA, the commercial vehicles that would deliver these cisterns to Palestinian 
villages have to coordinate with the crossing in advance.25 
	
 However, cisterns are only  short-term solutions because in order to have 
reliable and adequate water pressure, Palestinians would need a sufficient water 
supply, more than they are receiving now. The PWA clarified that  a solution could not 
come from within the village: “[The villages] are not connected in the same way as 
settlements, the dimensions of the pipe matter. If they are bigger, [there is] better 
pressure, but [the Palestinians] are provided only three to four centimeter pipes ... this 
is to control our quantity.”26  This comment makes a compelling point  that underlines 
how issues of power and control influence the size of water pipes, a problem that 
otherwise remains in the technical domain. 
 This point is is also mirrored in Karen Bakker’s writing, in which she discusses 
the concept of exclusion in water policy in Western Europe and North America during 
the second half of the 20th century. The development of water infrastructure occurred 
in the context of large-scale centralized planning, and generalized access to water 
represented a fundamental emblem of inclusionary  citizenship. As the Israelis receive 
substantially different levels of water provision, difference is being marked in a 
symbolic sense. Furthermore, the selective extension of the water network is a way to 
create and emphasize difference, similar to Bakker’s notion of inclusionary 
citizenship. On that basis, the inequality  of water access is a form of asserting who 
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belongs and who does not.27  The pattern of infrastructural development is inextricably 
linked and continuously influenced by power dynamics in the Jordan Valley.
 The water network, as we see in the comparative photos above, is part of the 
construction of difference through processes of segregation and exclusion enacted via 
“technologies of government.”28  The inequality  issue in regards to water distribution 
functions as a way for the state to establish legitimacy towards its “citizens,” while at 
the same time asserting control over space and resources through physical 
infrastructure and concurrent military authority policies. 
 In addition to infrastructural challenges, Zbeidat, by its natural topography, has 
three varying elevations,\ that  move upward in a steady incline. In response to Israel’s 
strict quotas and water planning scheme in Zbeidat, the village has made attempts to 
create a distribution system so that residents of the village have equitable access to the 
resource. It has set up  three separate distribution zones, using three different  pipes 
within the village. The first and lowest zone in the village receives the most water. As 
it lies right at the start of Mekorot’s pipe to the village, it is unaffected by consumption 
from elsewhere in the village. The second zone, slightly  more steep than the previous 
one, receives water only  at night, because the usage in Marj Ghazal, the previous 
village, is lower than in the day time. For the third zone, which is the highest, there is 
no water supplied through the third pipe because there are no means to pump  water to 
reach such a height. Figure 11 is a photo that shows the two lower zones of the village 
from the highest point in Zbeidat, in order to show the difference in elevations.
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 A Palestinian, whose family  resides on the highest elevation, shared his 
technique for accessing water: “My sister lives just below us, she lives on the second 
level of the village. At night they  have water because Marj Ghazal isn’t using as much. 
She fills [a tank] for us at  night so that we can use it the next day.”29 Some residents 
living on Zbeidat’s highest elevation receive their water by relying on family or 
community ties in the village. The head of Zbeidat’s local council has opted to use 
pressure pumps, another technique, to transfer water from the lower tiers of the village 
to the highest one. Figure 12 shows the way  these pumps are haphazardly  set up. Due 
to Israel’s restrictions on purchasing water pumps, Palestinians make use of the 
supplies available to them. 
 For the third zone, there is no water supply without these pumps or help of 
others in the community. But even this self-manufactured solution can only  address the 
water concerns only  temporarily due to the repercussions they cause village wide. The 
head of the village council admitted his concerns with people increasingly  relying on 
pressure pumps: “It is a problem because they  use too much electricity. Our [village] 
generator is weak, especially  in [summer], it’s hot, so the electricity is often being used 
in other ways.”30 In the long and dry  summers, the people of Zbeidat depend on wet 
cooling systems, which consume a great deal of electricity. Therefore, not only are the 
engineering costs a concern, but pumps also present challenges at the village level 
because they compromise electricity that is crucial during long summer months. While 
they  may address the issues in the short term, they are not an appropriate long-term 
solution to water shortages.
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Figure 11: A view of Zbeidat from the highest elevation, photo by author.
 An actual resolution necessitates addressing issues of water allocation, 
developing a new distribution plan, and rehabilitating poor infrastructure. Those would 
require the Palestinians to negotiate with the Israelis in the Joint Water Committee 
(JWC) and the Civil Administration. Moreover, as we have seen in the background 
portion, water allocation schemes are often addressed at the international level and 
involve numerous parties. Section II elaborates on the nuances of the Israeli 
bureaucratic processes for rehabilitating and developing the Palestinian water network.
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Figure 12: A pressure pump used on Zbeidat’s highest elevation, photo by author. 
 Bardala is another Palestinian village that lies in the northern region of the 
Jordan Valley. While water pressure and distribution issues within the village are of 
primary  concern for Zbeidat, Bardala’s primary struggle is sufficient water access to 
cultivate its agricultural land. The total area in Bardala village is 20,000 dunums, with 
only 480 dunums of land that is a “built up,” residential area. Its agricultural land 
consists of 10,000 dunums, which is rapidly shrinking due to the lack of water 
resources to maintain it.31 A representative from the PWA explained the circumstances: 
  In the Jordan Valley, [the villages] are connected to water, but it is not enough 
 supply  for agriculture, too. In the Jordan Valley, the water supply needs to be 
 more than in nonagricultural areas, but now it is either enough for one or the 
 other due to the quantity provided by Israel. 32
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Israel’s quotas for the village are only  enough for domestic water or agricultural water. 
It would cost double, and in some cases triple, the amount to buy additional tankers, 
thus rendering that option unaffordable. 
 The council head explained the ways in which Bardala’s land has shrunk by 
sizable amounts. “We used to cultivate 10,000 dunams, now we are only  cultivating 
4,000 dunams due to the decrease in water supply,” he stated, pointing to the village’s 
loss of over half its land since the occupation.33  Speaking further on the details of 
agricultural water, the village head stated:
 Bardala is given agricultural water only eight hours of the day, three days a 
 week. We have a large tank that Mekorot pumps to, and then they  distribute it 
 throughout the village. Eight hours a day maybe sounds good, but it is tough 
 when you need water, for example 2,000 dunams, and are only getting it for 
 half the amount of land. 34 
 In this case, the residents of Bardala are stuck in a compromise between 
domestic water for daily use or sustaining their means of livelihood, as agriculture has 
long been a critical component of Palestinian economic, social, and political life. 
Agriculture being the obvious compromise for drinking water, the amount of land 
available to Bardala for cultivation is decreasing and the surrounding Area C is 
encroaching onto its territory. Therefore, the built up  areas in Bardala, and other 
villages in the Jordan Valley  under similar circumstances, are becoming increasingly 
isolated. 
 A second concern for Bardala is a water distribution issue as a result of 
inadequate supply, similar to Zbeidat. In both villages, the water distribution was not 
set up according to the village’s topography and physical layout. Bardala has been 
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connected to Mekorot’s water network since 1975, a few years after the occupation. 
Before then, the region had approximately fourteen springs and seven wells, and 
Bardala, specifically, had three of its own water wells.35  However, due to Israeli 
prevention of rehabilitation of the wells that were destroyed in the war, these wells 
could no longer function. As such, Israel gained control of the water supply  in the 
northern Jordan Valley and today, Israel is the main provider of water resources to 
Bardala and surrounding areas.36  
 A PWA representative described how Israel’s control over the local water 
resources developed: 
 The [Israeli] developers approached the Palestinian farmer  communities [after 
 the 1967 war] and promised them a connection to the Israeli network and 
 inquired into the quantity  needed to irrigation and domestic usage. They  were 
 told that they  must pay for the cost of pumping and their supply  would 
 continue.37 
Because the infrastructure and network was in ruins due to the war, and because 
permission was not granted to rehabilitate, the Palestinians opted for a connection to 
the newer network. This also marked the beginning of Israel’s occupation of the West 
Bank and the government’s view that development of local water systems and 
infrastructure represented a good economic and security investment. Rather than 
maintaining water supply to the Palestinians and increasing it according to population 
growth and need, Bardala faced a loss of autonomy  over water resources. In addition, 
Israel gradually reduced the amount of water being supplied to the Bardala well year 
by year, even as it increased the prices.38                 
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 Today, with no autonomy over its water and strict  quotas, Bardala has supply 
problems, similar to the other case studies in this chapter. However, with the help of 
increasing NGO and international donor agencies, Bardala has more funding to 
allocate towards creating its own internal distribution scheme, one that is more 
efficient that Zbeidat’s. Because its water supply was within the village and did not 
affect  the Mekorot well in any  way, it  was easier to obtain permission from the 
Israelis. The scheme divided the village into three zones, with each section of the 
village receiving twelve hours of supply per day. Before this distribution scheme, those 
at the beginning of Mekorot’s pipe would consume the greatest quantity  of water, 
similar to Zbeidat. The village head stated that the new distribution plan was the only 
solution to the limitations on supply. Also, it required the least  engagement in the Joint 
Water Committee’s and Civil Administration’s permit process. The residents 
configured a system that would alternate the water supply between day  and night for 
the difference zones. 
 A resident from Zbeidat pointed out that his village was in need of a similar 
system. However, because Bardala has a lot less population density and, ironically, 
more physical space, it is easier to implement projects. A member from a Palestinian 
community development organization further detailed that due to the difficulties 
already faced by international donors because of Israeli building restrictions, they look 
to areas where they can work more easily. Bardala has more space in Area B so it can 
route pipes on the edge of the village, creating a better water distribution plan.39 
 The only place in Zbeidat left to build is in surrounding Area C. Therefore, it 
needs a building permit from the Israeli authorities to install new pipes. An informant 
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from a local Palestinian nonprofit also mentioned that to begin the project they would 
require access to the main Mekorot well, which unquestionably required a permit.40
	
 Zbeidat’s case is also different because the main well from which it gets water 
is intended to supply Argaman, the settlement that rests close to the village. There lie 
the complexities in changing the water distribution for Zbeidat. It is not only an 
internal village matter, as in Bardala, but also an issue that affects the nearby 
settlement. Bardala’s main well, on the other hand, is not supplying a settlement. The 
two varying situations create a different framework within which the villages can work 
to make a change. Consequently, Zbeidat, which is suffering from severe water 
shortages and a higher population density, with increasing needs, is unable to address 
its challenges. Circumstances such as these compel Palestinians to migrate out of the 
city, the impacts of which I return to in chapter 5. 
	
 Although Bardala has a little more flexibility to redistribute its water, an 
insufficient supply affects both villages. In great dismay, one of the village council 
heads said, “What happens [here] depends on politics. It’s contingent on Israel. They 
control everything: land, water, sky.”41 While Zbeidat and Bardala try to maneuver the 
conditions with the resources at their disposal, the solutions are only short-term. In 
order for enduring solutions to take place, we must examine the hegemonic structures 
at work.
	
 The conditions for Palestinians in the Jordan Valley continue to deteriorate and 
remain beyond the jurisdiction of Palestinian institutions. If Palestinians seek to build 
or develop their communities in the Jordan Valley, it is up to Israeli discretion. In stark 
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contrast to the Jordan Valley, the Rawabi case study provides insight into a situation 
where development is being attempted. The first planned Palestinian city identifies 
itself as a sign of fresh hope for economic recovery in the West Bank.42 While building 
restrictions are eased in Area A, water restrictions are not. The ambulatory nature of 
water means that unlike other boundaries, it is not fixed and Palestinian area 
designations are irrelevant. 
 During the initial states of the Rawabi project, the recently resigned Prime 
Minister Salam Fayyad announced that he would “build, not establish, a state”  through 
economic and development projects, after realizing that the negotiations over a 
political solution would not prosper. The city of Rawabi is one part to his ambitious 
nation-building plans.43  How possible is it to separate Rawabi from other dimensions 
of the conflict? In particular, without sovereignty over its water resources, how can 
Rawabi acquire access to a reliable water supply to provide for the type of community 
it seeks to develop? 
Rawabi: A Failure in Advance? 
 Rawabi is an especially interesting case in the West Bank today. The new city 
is filled with homes built from eco-friendly materials, and parks, and boasts a state-of-
the-art public transportation system connected by fiber optic cables. According to its 
creator, Bashar al-Masri, a Palestinian business tycoon, Rawabi has the capacity  to 
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accommodate 40,000 people, and it is set  to generate almost 8,000 new jobs.44 Figures 
13 and 14 show depictions of the new planned city, which portray the ideals that al-
Masri has put forward.  
Figure 13: Rawabi housing ad, adapted from Rawabi’s housing website.45
 The high-tech city  within the context of a nonexistent state unsurprisingly 
sounds like a dream. One of the main practical (and expected) problems for this new 
town is how to gain access to water and provide a sustainable supply to the kind of 
community it strives to promote. Following a handful of meetings with a developer at 
Rawabi, predictably identified Rawabi’s water supply, with no obvious source, to be a 
concern. The project  developers went through procedures identified by the Israelis to 
obtain approval for their Master Plan and have completed an “impact assessment.”46 
While following this bureaucratic process with the Israeli authorities, Rawabi spent 
months trying to negotiate the city’s water source. At the time of writing, the city’s 
planning authorities were still in talks with the Israelis to determine how water would 
be piped into the city.
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Figure 14: 3D graphic of Rawabi housing, adapted from Rawabi’s website.
 Ultimately, the developer listed three options that the Rawabi team presented to 
the Joint Water Committee (JWC). One option proposed that the project be linked to 
Jerusalem Water Undertaking’s (JWU) network. However, this option was the most 
unlikely because it would require that Israel increase its supply to the JWU. The 
second option was to connect to the Israeli settlement, Atarot’s, water network and get 
a direct supply from Mekorot.  Rawabi’s developer mentioned the two downsides to 
this approach: 1) it  would mean feeding into an already increasing dependency on 
Mekorot; and, 2) the contentious relationship with the settlement community  could 
inhibit the proposal’s approval in the JWC. Option three would supply water to 
Rawabi from Sinjil, a Palestinian village northeast of Ramallah. This was considered 
the least preferred of all options due to the costs and logistics of transferring water 
from such distance. The third option would require a pipe from Sinjil to Rawabi, 
which would necessitate infrastructure to cross Area C and Atarot’s land. It  is also the 
most expensive option due to the various stages that would need Israeli approval and 
funding to implement.47  The ideal option for the developers was to receive its supply 
from the JWU, despite its superficiality, as the Palestinian utility would serve as an 
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interface between Rawabi and Israel. Involving the JWU in the water distribution 
process would maintain Palestinian presence in the water distribution process. It would 
also provide the city of Rawabi with the least costly and most efficient water supply. 
 During a JWC negotiation session, Israel told the Palestinians that, “if you stop 
discussing refugees and right to return issues, we will provide water for this project 
and additional new projects like Rawabi ... [for] other new modern development.”48 
The implication of the Israeli claim is tremendous. It highlights the interplay  between 
the technical and political domains. It further illustrates the way in which final status 
issues are inextricably linked to one another. Without an appropriate and reliable water 
supply, the Rawabi project will struggle to promote itself as a symbol of development 
in lieu of politics. Moreover, it reveals the role that control over water resources has on 
the development of a future Palestinian state. The developers from Rawabi were told 
explicitly at the JWC negotiations that a project similar to the private city would be 
fully realized, but at the expense of Palestinians’ claims to self determination.
Conclusion
	
 These seemingly technical issues of water supply and poorly maintained water 
distribution systems are the direct result of clear power differentials between Israelis 
and Palestinians. This section shows how the distribution of water is used to maintain 
power inequalities and thwart Palestinian state-building initiatives. Hence, it shows 
how a seemingly technical issue, such as water availability and distribution, can in fact 
be a manifestation of underlying political power struggles. 
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 In the Jordan Valley, the water distribution mechanisms do not take into 
account the physical layout of the villages in order to ensure a reliable water supply. 
Jericho and Ramallah, although both declared Palestinian autonomous areas, have 
struggled to develop water resources to meet the needs of an increasing population. 
The former, while having its own resource, could not develop  its infrastructure and 
grow in order to increase its efficiency in water supply; and the latter was dependent 
upon Mekorot’s quotas. Rawabi presented a quintessential example of how the lack of 
Palestinian access to water resources will affect future growth in the West Bank. 
Israel’s effects upon the water sector in this chapter are evident, but by rendering the 
problems technical, it is not  held accountable. To an outsider, without this knowledge, 
it is assumed that Palestinian mismanagement is the primary  cause of problems in the 
water sector. 
 While the technical approach seeks to separate out a pragmatic and concrete 
focus on water issues from the broader ideological claims, it is the latter that calls to 
mind the fundamentally political part of Lasswell’s question about distribution: Who 
gets what, when, where, how, and why. The technical approach in traditional water 
science frames Palestinian challenges in the water sector in objective and quantifiable 
language, in order to solve a problem. As a result, the solutions that are implemented, 
whether through local initiatives or international funding, create a gap between what is 
attempted and what is accomplished. The status quo remains unchallenged and the 
solutions do not match the problems. 
 Furthermore, politics is assumed too abstract and complex to resolve the water 
crisis.  Abstracted notions put politics beyond the reach of people.  However, ideology 
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alone cannot sustain control. Ideas must be ungirded by material, “hard” power.49  The 
following section looks at how “hard power”  manifests itself in the West Bank. The 
conditions on the ground are tangible results of the politics. Issues that are generally 
approached as technical shortcomings are also materializations of power and 
politics.  
Hard Power: Antiquated Palestinian Water Infrastructure
“Breathing is the only thing we don’t need a permit for, yet.” 
 -Aziz Kanaan, Head of Jiftlek’s Local Village Council
 High rates of physical losses, or unaccounted for water, in conveyance and 
network supply  systems reduce by  one third the water resources available to the 
Palestinians in the West Bank.50  Due to consequences of Israeli military orders 
implemented after 1967, in particular military order 158, on the development of 
Palestinian water network and rehabilitation of water installations, water is not being 
used efficiently in the Palestinian communities. As a result, water loss from poorly 
maintained water networks is a primary  concern for its consumers, who are already 
struggling to meet their needs within  Israel’s water quotas. Therefore, high water 
losses contribute negatively to the Palestinian water supply.  
 The head of Jiftlek’s village council in the Jordan Valley, cites the myriad of 
ways in which movement and access restrictions have affected their daily  lives. As a 
result of impediments, Palestinian water projects are often stuck in emergency  mode. 
Therefore, whatever projects do get administered by  JWC and Civil Administration 
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approval are often short-term relief work. This is mainly  due to the difficulties that 
come with acquiring new systems of water supply or rehabilitating existing ones. 
 The Palestinian Hydrology Group, in its annual Water, Sanitation and Hygiene 
report (WaSH), found that the water supply network suffers from the highest rates of 
loss during the process of distribution.51  A main cause of water loss is worn out and 
antiquated pipe networks. The grave deficiencies cause high leakage rates and weak 
water pressure in the system. Damaged networks are a major problem that  stem from 
both institutional weaknesses and the restrictions posed by military  orders on the 
Palestinian development of the water sector.52 
 The restrictions imposed by  Israeli authorities prohibit Palestinians from 
accessing the infrastructure in very basic ways. A member of the PWA explained, “Our 
well potential has decreased over the last fifteen years. We need to rehabilitate, 
replace, or maintain the infrastructure, but need permits in all Areas, A, B, and C.”53 
Further, he clarified that indeed there was a misperception that in Area A access to 
infrastructure was easier due to greater PA autonomy, but in water, he said, “there are 
no borders, no administrative borders.”54  He was making a point to say  that all projects 
related to water must go through the JWC. Otherwise, to build homes in autonomous 
regions, as was the case in Jericho, permits are often easier to obtain. An 
environmental engineer and geographer for the Hebrew University  in Jerusalem 
reflected the same ideas as the PWA representative: “[Palestinians] must go through 
the JWC and the Civil Administration because water crosses boundaries, one area 
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inevitably  affects the other because of interrelations.”55  Not  only is the fluidity  of 
water an issue, but if one Palestinian well is constructed in close proximity to an 
Israeli well, the latter’s output could be compromised as a result of the lowered water 
table. In order to submit  a proposal to implement a project, the Palestinian Authority 
must take it to the JWC. Additionally, if it is located in Area C, it  must also get a 
second approval by the Civil Administration, for all wells, water conveyance, 
wastewater treatment, and reuse infrastructure.56  In some cases, a third obstacle is 
internal conflicting interests between the JWC and Civil Administration. If a project is 
granted approval by the JWC, it is not necessary for the Civil Administration also to 
grant approval.
 Initially, the Oslo II agreement aimed to transfer water responsibilities in the 
Territories from Israel to the Palestinian Authority. However, in practice it did not 
grant any real authority over control and management of water resources within its 
territory. It indirectly placed restrictions on the PA’s ability to develop the water and 
sanitation sectors by establishing the JWC.57  The military  orders for the Palestinian 
sector were also left  unattended in the Oslo proces. The JWC was required to approve 
all proposed projects in the West Bank before implementation. Article VII, paragraph 
3, declares, “Israel may request that the legislation subcommittee decide whether such 
legislation exceeds the jurisdiction of the PA or it  otherwise is inconsistent with the 
provisions of this Agreement.”58  In the JWC and its subcommittees, membership  is 
equally split between the Israelis and Palestinians. Furthermore, all water and 
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sanitation projects in the Territory  must  be approved through the act  of consensus. 
However, this is problematic because the Israeli members of the JWC have an 
effective veto power over any Palestinian project. By virtue of its inequitable structure, 
asymmetrical licensing procedure, and own military dominance, Israel has been able to 
implement all projects without the committee’s approval.59  Consequently, the PA was 
stripped of its capacities to control and manage its water resources and infrastructure. 
Instead, it was left with the duty of monitoring day-to-day services. Even these duties, 
on some level, were restricted by Israeli military action.60
 As of 2009, 106 water and 12 large scale wastewater projects await JWC 
approval, while others have been waiting since 1999. Out of $121 million in projects 
presented to JWC from 2001 to 2008, 50% by  value ($60.4 million) have been 
approved, and one third have been implemented or began construction.61 The approved 
projects sometimes include “conditional approvals” and must be resubmitted to the 
JWC once they are revised, which can prolong their implementation. The loss of donor 
funding due to time constraints is an additional obstacle preventing the implementation 
of projects. In the case that a project has begun, there have been times when it is 
approved by the JWC, but faces resistance from the Civil Administration, which closes 
off a project site as a “closed military zone.” As I mentioned earlier, conflicting 
interests between the two bodies can create more hurdles to successfully completing a 
project pertaining to the water sector. 
 In the following two case studies, proposals for rehabilitation and new water 
infrastructure must go to the JWC. Because they  are both in Area A, additional 
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approval from the Civil Administration is required if the project crosses or water 
resources are located in Area C.
The Jerusalem Water Undertaking: Infrastructure in Ramallah and Al-Bireh
“We are supplying various areas, but need coordination with the Israeli authorities to 
cross Area C. There are no JWU consumers in C, but we do have infrastructure there. 
All of our wells are located in C. We need to coordinate with the [Civil Administration] 
in order to repair or get any new wells. It doesn’t matter even where the infrastructure 
is, if it has to do with rehabilitation or repairing, we need to take it to the JWC” 
-Amar Salhoub, Jerusalem Water Undertaking, July 7th, 2012.
 Despite the fact that the Jerusalem Water Undertaking is autonomous, the 
utility still encounters difficulties. While it depends on Mekorot for a majority of its 
water supply, its local resources are also subject to Israeli policies because they are 
located in Area C. The JWU’s wells were built before 1967.
 In order to meet the needs of a growing population, the JWU has tried to 
propose a central borehole alongside its wells. A borehole would serve as an 
alternative to the utility’s main water supply, providing a private resource to be used 
for domestic or agricultural purposes.62  A piped system would necessitate more 
external funding, but a borehole would function as a community well with a pump, 
adding additional water resources to the current supply.63  However, an employee from 
the JWU explained the frustrating process: “It  was not so efficient [...]. We shifted 
locations six times, after each time the process gets stretched.”64 
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 The borehole was an attempt to address the issues of nonrevenue water, 
otherwise referred to as unaccounted-for water (UFW). Unaccounted-for water is the 
difference between the quantity of water supplied to an area’s network versus the 
metered quantity  of water used by  the customers. There are two types of water loss 
that  take place: (a) physical losses due to leakage from pipes, and (b) administrative 
losses due to illegal connections and under registration of water meters.65  The 
percentage of physical losses is influenced not only  by  the deterioration of the piped 
network, but also by the total amount of water used, system pressure, and the degree of 
supply continuity.66 
 Physical losses are attributable to three other factors as well: 1) the 
inconsistency of supply and the resulting cutoffs, which are most common during the 
summer months; 2) compromised water pressure due to weak water supply  (the JWU 
faces complications with regularity of supply due to Mekorot’s quotas, thus decreasing 
water pressure); and 3) with the poorly developed water network, water losses also 
increase. On the other hand, the percentage of administrative losses depends on the 
degree of effort exerted in identifying illegal connections and in repairing meters. 
Identifying illegal connections is an internal issue because unaccounted-for water 
affects the JWU’s revenue, not Mekorot’s; therefore it is in the JWU’s interest to 
monitor illegal activity. The company still pays for the quantity of water supplied by 
the Israeli carrier. That which is lost in distribution is a loss for the Palestinian utility. 
In order to rehabilitate the infrastructure to prevent water loss, the JWU must go to the 
JWC. Therein lie challenges of developing the water network—the  ultimate Catch-22. 
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 Elaborating more on the problem of unaccounted-for water, a Director from the 
Ramallah Al-Bireh utility acknowledged, “Of course our unaccounted-for water is 
increasing. Our networks are almost fifty years old. We just took some loans, but 
usually depend on grants, but due to lack of grants available at the time, the JWU took 
out a $5.5 million dollar loan. Our goal is to reach 20% UFW rates, but right now we 
are at 25%. It’s impossible to have 0%.”67  Most of the funding is put toward 
decreasing administrative losses, due to the difficulty in reducing physical losses. 
There are no other options available to the JWU other than to rely  on grants and soft 
loans to rehabilitate the water sector and, on occasion, pay  Palestinian salaries. This is 
because the revenue generated within the current framework is not enough to satisfy 
the several dimensions of maintaining and developing the networks.  
 The same Director from the JWU explained that one reason for a lack of 
funding was the Hamas victory  in 2006. Following this event, political repercussions 
of the election victory resulted in the suspension of many internationally funded water 
projects and a lot of development programs withdrew their support..68  As a 
consequence, the lack of financial aid impeded the delivery of many  governmental 
services. 69  “If there are no donor funds, then the cost burden is put on the people, but 
the people cannot afford it,” the JWU Director commented. The impacts of cutting 
back funding in 2006 added more pressure to the water service providers because with 
the outbreak of the second intifada, just  a few years earlier, projects were also 
suspended. After the second intifada, the Israelis increased restrictions on Palestinian 
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movement and activities through military checkpoints and roadblocks. For that reason, 
it became harder and harder to implement crucial water projects.70
 One such example is the Hizmah well project. In early  2008, the JWU applied 
for permission to drill a new well in order to supplement its water supply. Hizmah was 
one of three potential locations for the project, but the most likely  to be approved.71 
Although it was in Area C, it was granted approval from the JWC. It  also required 
clearance from the Civil Administration, but according to the JWU: “They keep saying 
move it 50 meters, 60 meters. ... Then there is the hassle of getting approval for the 
pump. And so on.”72 Approval for the pump was not the only concern, but  after each 
revision that was made to the project, the JWU was required to resubmit its proposal to 
the JWC. Almost five years later, the JWU is still looking for a site for the well. 
 Jericho is another example of a city that  should be a model for Palestinian 
autonomy and self-governance. The JWU in Ramallah and Al-Bireh, as well as the 
Jericho municipality, struggles to find solutions to make sustainable improvements to 
its water networks. Throughout my  fieldwork interviews, frustration with the JWC was 
a persistent theme. Palestinian governing bodies, on the local and national levels, felt 
that  their hands were tied even in circumstances of “autonomy.”73 They were stuck in a 
paradoxical scenario in which water infrastructure was inadequate, but the 
rehabilitation procedures as defined by the Israelis kept them from finding any  real 
solutions. 
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 In the following section, I discuss the details of two water projects in Jericho. 
One speaks more to the tensions that exist between the JWC and Civil Administration. 
Although usually  Jericho is not required to submit proposals to the Civil 
Administration as well as the JWC, the Jericho Well 1 project  was located in Area C. 
The second water project in Jericho illustrates how the permit process and restrictions 
to Palestinian land access frequently yield substandard results. 
 
The City of Jericho
 As Jericho is confronted with an increasing demand for water, it desperately 
needs to rehabilitate and expand its water resources. Further, if it fails to maintain Ein 
Al-Sultan, the city’s primary means of self-sufficiency will be lost. Jericho’s struggle 
lies in sustaining itself as a water resource provider, while trying to augment its water 
supply from nearby resources.
 The “Jericho Well No. 1” project is an example of the municipality’s attempt to 
increase its supply for the area by  combining the well’s water with Ein al-Sultan’s 
supply. It serves as a quintessential example of confrontation between the JWC and 
Civil Administration. Jericho Well 1 is in Area C and therefore, requires additional 
approval of the Civil Administration. Otherwise, Jericho projects are submitted only  to 
the JWC. 
 The project is one piece of the larger Japanese funded project called the 
“Corridor of Peace,”  developed by the Japanese diplomat Hideaki Yamamoto in 
2006.74 The well project includes an industrial and agricultural park in the West Bank 
and tries to “encourage greater regional cooperation which, it is hoped, will lead to 
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economic growth, greater trust and eventually peace.”75  It includes cooperative 
projects with Israel and Jordan in order to establish stronger partnerships. Projects like 
this, with a similar grandiose end goal, are not unique to the West Bank. “Corridor of 
Peace” assumes that functional cooperation among Israel, Jordan, and the Palestinian 
Territories and the creation of supranational task-related organizations is the most 
promising avenue to achieving peace.76  How feasible is it  for the Jericho Well 1 
project to promote the ideals of the “Corridor of Peace” project? It is the prime 
example of a technocratic approach, with an assumption that low politics foster greater 
understanding in higher areas of policy making. 
 The Palestinian component, Jericho Well No. 1 initiative, seeks to find a water 
resource for the city’s municipality, to supply the Aqbat Jabr refugee camp within the 
governorate’s boundaries. Theoretically speaking, Jabr camp should already be 
receiving its water supply from the Palestinian municipality, but because of increasing 
demands, Jericho is unable to provide for the camp. More frequent shortages occurring 
during the summer months in Jericho further reflect the pressure on the city’s demand. 
Therefore, the Jabr camp relies on Mekorot for its water. The Japanese initiative 
intends to build Jericho’s capacities as an autonomous Palestinian water provider so 
that it can be a stronger asset to the “Corridor of Peace.”
 Before the Oslo agreement, the Jericho Well 1 was used by Israel. After the 
Peace Accords in 1995, it was shut  down and walled in with a cement barrier, as 
pictured in Figure 15. Since 2011, the Palestinian Water Authority has been negotiating 
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in the JWC with hopes of rehabilitating the abandoned well and utilizing its supply for 
Jericho.
 The land and hills that surround the Jericho well rests in Area C, which created 
challenges for the project  proposal. Finally, due to the significance of the “Corridor of 
Peace” project to the region and Japanese International Cooperation Agency (JICA) 
funding that backed the proposal, the JWC approved Jericho’s utilization of the well. 
The head of Jericho’s municipality reflected on the benefits of its water supply: “It will 
be perfect for us, giving us 180 cubic meters per hour, that would solve our problem of 
increasing demand for at least the next five years.”77  Further, he said, “The PWA even 
got the funding from JICA to make a pipe to Jabr camp and they  began to 
construct...”78 In spite of that, a few months later construction was interrupted and the 
project came to a halt.
 Without notice, the Civil Administration declared the project site as a “closed 
military  zone,” and although the city refuted this and provided evidence of JWC 
approval, Jericho Well No. 1 was stopped. This example highlights the conflicting 
interests of the JWC and Civil Administration. On one level, the project was given the 
green light, but even within Israeli water governance, there were internal tensions that 
prevented progress. Following trouble from the Israeli miltary, JICA representatives 
met  with the Israeli authorities to discuss the permit process. No promise was made, 
but JICA and the PWA were granted permission to revise their proposal. The PWA 
resubmitted the proposal to the JWC to forward it  to the Civil Administration. While I 
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was conducting these interviews with the Jericho municipality, the Jericho Well 1 
project had been put on hold until additional approval from the military authorities. 
Figure 15: Jericho Well 1, photo by author. 
 The second project in this section is Jericho’s wastewater project. It brings 
attention to the ways in which land access restrictions and Israel’s permit process yield 
substandard results. Jericho has tried to develop  its water sector by  also seeking 
funding for a wastewater treatment plant. In 2011, it received funding from JICA to 
implement this project. Two challenges confronted the project proposal in the JWC: 1) 
the high requirement set  by Israel for effluent quality  (the level of treatment of 
wastewater) required tertiary treatment of wastewater and thus, extra funding; and, 2) 
the location of the facility because the only available land in Area A was in close 
proximity to residential areas. Due to potential health implications of building a 
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wastewater treatment plant near Palestine homes, Jericho had to look elsewhere to 
build. Palestinian areas in the Jordan Valley are designated as either A or B, while the 
rest of the Jordan Valley is under Israeli jurisdiction. However, Jericho only has access 
to land that is designated Area A. “So what were we supposed to do?” asked a 
hydrologist from the Jericho municipality. “We do own land in Area C, but due to the 
settler road nearby  and the declaration of area surrounding us as a military  zone, our 
request was denied.”79 
 The city was left  with two choices: either losing the JICA funding or going 
forth with building the treatment plant in Area A, close to residential areas. The city 
opted for the latter, and today it is located approximately 500 meters from peoples’ 
homes. After the plant was established, the city acknowledged it was, “risky for the 
communities’ health and sanitation,” and admitted that, “many  people opposed [the 
project] and many continue to complain”80 It was better in the eyes of the governorate 
to have a wastewater treatment plan than not  to have one at all. According to the 
municipality, without a proper cleaning station, the wastewater caused damage to 
prime agricultural land in the city. The politics led to an inadequate plan, which was 
implemented due to the fear of losing international funding. In the eyes of the 
community, the outcome of the plant came across as mismanagement  on the city’s 
side, as well as a frustration with the city’s way of prioritizing international funding. 
This has resulted in subsequent tensions between the local community  and Jericho’s 
government. The myriad of obstacles hinders the government from providing proper 
services to its community  and impedes Palestinian water sector development. The 
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consolidating power of central institutions, such as the JWC and Civil Administration, 
have diminished the autonomy of Palestinian communities, much like Jericho. 
 The Palestinian villages of the Jordan Valley are subject to both of the central 
institutions, on a regular basis. While, Jericho is able to maintain ties with other Area 
A cities in the West Bank, such as Ramallah, Palestinians in the Jordan Valley  are 
isolated from the other cities and towns in the Territory. This is an outcome directly 
related to Israel’s de facto annexation of the Jordan Valley.
“Everything Here Is Provided by the NGOs”: Jordan Valley’s Struggle to Build
“The NGOs are not giving us money for free, it’s a political thing. They are giving the 
Palestinians money instead of political order. It’s just an economic agreement. If they 
don’t want to give us money, [they can do that], but they also know what will happen. 
Let the occupation end and we don’t need the NGOs.”
- Samir Zbeidat, a resident of Zbeidat, July 24th, 2012
 “A gift from the American people.” This is one of the many slogans plastered 
across massive USAID billboards alongside the half undeveloped projects in the West 
Bank. JICA, the German government, France, Swedish agencies, and various agencies 
also have a tremendous presence in Palestinian cities and villages. Some are 
completed, while others have been delayed for over a decade.  
 In the above quote, a resident from Zbeidat and representative from a 
Palestinian nonprofit,  gave his insights on the abundance of international aid in his 
village. He pointed out that what the NGOs and international donors are doing is at the 
cost of political order. By providing superficial solutions in the Jordan Valley’s water 
sector, the causal circumstances are veiled. At the same time, they are the main 
resources for villages in the Jordan Valley. He says, “If they  don’t want to give us 
money, [they  can do that], but they  also know what will happen.” Without the help  of 
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international agencies, there is absolutely no rehabilitation taking place. Some 
infrastructure was either damaged during the 1967 war and never rehabilitated or is 
currently in need of maintenance and is struggling to obtain funding, as well as permit 
approval. The infrastructure that currently requires rehabilitation is stuck in emergency 
mode, similar to the point Jiftlek’s village head made earlier. That being the case, 
international organizations are merely  taking part  in relief work. While “political 
order” remains absent, the longevity of the work being done is undermined. 
 To further aggravate conditions on the ground, some projects are left 
unfinished, comparable to the Jericho Well 1 project. The multi-layered bureaucratic 
process that is necessary to obtain project approval has staggered or stopped them 
completely. Projects are most often denied by the JWC or Civil Administration due to 
issues of land designation. Villages, such as Jiftlek, Zbeidat, and Bardala, are 
disconnected by  Israeli military  bases and settlements which restrict a great  deal of 
Palestinian land access. It also strictly limits the physical space available for 
Palestinians to develop the water resources and expand their communities. 
 Although Area C interferes with the cohesiveness of the West Bank as a whole, 
it is especially  the case in the Jordan Valley  where it covers almost 95%. While 
Palestinians have control over only 5.62% of the valley, 50% is controlled by Israeli 
Settlement Regional Councils, and 44.37% is designated, by  Israel, as closed military 
zones. As noted earlier, Areas B and Area C require that Palestinians obtain permits 
from the Israeli Civil Administration to undertake any type of construction.81 
International donors are also not exempt from this process. 
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 All of my  interviewees from the Jordan Valley village councils referred to 
Zbeidat as the example of “worst case scenario” for a Palestinian area with limited 
resources, land, and water. Below, the village council head from Ein al-Beida, located 
next to Bardala in the north, talks about the problems facing Area C building 
restrictions and points to the situation in Zbeidat  as something that could be in Ein al-
Beida’s foreseeable future: 
  Our village is at maximum capacity and soon we are going to have to build 
 illegally just to absorb our growing population. Our neighbor Bardala has 
 exactly the same problem. We both have had families try to build in Area C on 
 the outskirts of the village, but the Israelis have demolished their structures 
 just as soon as they built it. If we do not solve this problem soon, we are going 
 to be facing a similar situation as in Zbeidat where we will be imprisoned on 
 an area of land that is too small for us.82
! The council’s head explains that while they  are allowed to build in Area B, it is 
not enough to meet the village’s needs. Palestinians in the Jordan Valley  do not have 
access to Area A and are left balancing their lives between B and C. When their homes 
in Area C are demolished by  the Israeli military, it is because they do not have permit 
approvals. Eventually, the situation will lead to what has happened in Zbeidat. It 
cannot expand horizontally, so villagers have resorted to building vertically. The issue 
with that is the strength of the land. A local villager told me that significant portions of 
Zbeidat were agricultural and, therefore, unable to support large infrastructure. Over 
the years, the village has built  on its agricultural land that was in Area B. It was easier 
to get approval to cultivate in Area C than to build on it. So, even with a great deal of 
restrictions upon Palestinian agricultural practices in Area C, it was better for the 
village to build homes on more autonomous land than it was to not build at all. 
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 The issues of land and water in the West  Bank are closely intertwined. Land 
designations play a tremendous role in issues of water resource access. The division 
between water as a pragmatic issue versus a political one quickly disappears when 
empirical accounts show its relationship  to Israel’s territorial claims, those deeply 
rooted in ideology. 
 In Figure 16, the head of the Zbeidat’s village council shows the way in which 
these area designations are manifest on the ground. He points with his right hand to 
Area B, and with his left, to Area C. His home rests rights along the Area B and Area 
C boundary, on Zbeidat’s highest elevation, where he also struggles with water supply. 
His only  access to water is through self-manufactured water pumps, as seen in the 
previous section on water supply. “There is just  a sixteen centimeter difference” he 
says, as he stands on an invisible line that separates the two worlds: one Israeli and the 
other Palestinian. 
 Area C begins directly in his back yard where his date trees are planted, ones 
that  have been removed several times by the military, whose outpost also rests on the 
hill just a few feet behind the trees.83  For this very reason, Zbeidat is considered “the 
worst case scenario.” It  is enclosed by Area C, with a settlement resting directly above 
it on a hill. Its population density is steadily increasing, with no space to continue 
building.
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Figure 16: Area B and Area C in Zbeidat, photo by author.
 A resident of Zbeidat who has seen through numerous project failures in the 
Jordan Valley discussed the state of affairs in his village: “NGOs have been working 
here since almost 2000, but there has been little change, especially in water, and then 
millions of dollars are wasted. This is mostly a political problem, so we must  talk in 
politics.” He succinctly noted that “there is literally  one party who water supply is 
contingent on. Water isn’t a development issue, it’s a political one. What am I going to 
do with a tank if I have no water for it?”84 For the last thirteen years, NGOs have been 
providing for Zbeidat. It has reached a point where the village has run out of space to 
continue on this trend. In his conversation, this Zbeidat resident explains that water 
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tanks are not the issue, but rather the absence of politics is the issue. Although 
problematic in many  ways, donor agencies have made their niche in the West Bank 
and remain a significant resource for Palestinian government bodies. With the 
obstacles to implementing the ideal project, Palestinian utilities and local governments 
are left  with two options: to either accept no project or accept  one that yields 
suboptimal results. In most cases, as with the Jericho wastewater project, they chose to 
use the funds in some way, rather than not use them at all. 
 Another common dilemma for rehabilitating and developing new water 
infrastructure is: a permit, but no funding. (By the time funding is obtained, the permit 
can be lost if, say, the Israelis declare the site of the project a “closed military  zone.”) 
Alternately, the dilemma is: funding, but no permit. This latter scenario often leads to 
loss of donor money because agencies have time limits on projects and funds released. 
And, in both cases, the outcome is no project. For that reason, not using international 
funding is a significant loss for the Palestinians, if they are in the rare situation of 
having a permit and funding simultaneously. It  is easier to fall into one of the previous 
scenarios, so Palestinian government bodies go ahead with projects, even if they 
produce suboptimal or delayed results. 
 Below, I discuss two cases of water projects in Jiftlek, a Palestinian village that 
lies approximately 30 kilometers north of Jericho city. The first shows how a project 
proposal can be delayed due to additional steps required by the Civil Administration in 
the West Bank. The second case gives another empirical account of the Catch-22 
situation that Palestinians face in addressing problems of water sector rehabilitation. 
This problem is pervasive in the West Bank and was seen earlier with the Jerusalem 
Water Undertaking.
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 In 1999, the PWA was approached by an international development program 
with the funding to upgrade the water distribution system in Jiftlek. Although Jiftlek is 
beyond the PWA’s jurisdiction, it is the sole fundraiser and representative for the 
Palestinian water sector. The PWA submitted the project proposal to the JWC and it 
was not until three years later, in 2002, that it received the first approval from the 
committee.85  After this, the PWA sent Jiftlek’s proposal to the Israeli Civil 
Administration. The Civil Administration includes twelve departments, such as 
electricity, infrastructure, agriculture, planning, etc. In order to implement the 
rehabilitation project, the proposal must be granted by each department. 
 In 2005, conditional approval was given by the Civil Administration because 
its Department of Agriculture claimed that the project site was of historical 
significance. It  required that the PWA have an examination conducted at the site, by  an 
Israeli archaeologist. The additional expenses were deducted from the project’s budget. 
Following a close survey of the site, the Civil Administration decided that the design 
of the project must  be changed to accommodate the land’s archaeological value. As the 
proposal was revised, the PWA had to resubmit the request to all twelve Civil 
Administration departments. In this time period, the Palestinians lost  the initial 
international funding that was offered for this particular project, due to the 
organization’s time constraints. Consequently, the costs had to be covered by  the 
Palestinian Ministry  of Finance to rehabilitate the waterline in Jiftlek. However, the 
funds were only enough to cover preliminary costs. The PWA submitted several grants 
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to various international NGOs, one of which was finally accepted. Altogether, the 
Jiftlek project took took almost ten years to complete.86
 The prior project rehabilitated a few of the pipes in Jiftlek, but the distribution 
plan remained the same. Jiftlek, like many other Palestinian villages in the Jordan 
Valley, have a distribution system that produces a “soccer field effect.” To rectify  the 
problem in Jiftlek, the PWA sought funding from an international relief organization. 
The project was for a water storage tank in the center of the village, which would 
distribute water from the main Mekorot  line evenly to the Palestinian households. The 
new project would build a central water tank in the village that would connect to the 
main line coming in from the Israeli source. Mekorot’s main well and quantity of 
water would remain unaffected by the  project. 
 Figure 17 shows how the “soccer field” distribution is set up in Bardala, 
Zbeidat, and Jiftlek, compared to what the new project proposed. On the left, the 
Mekorot well provides water to Jiftlek, but the first home consumes the greatest 
amount because it is the first consumer, as opposed to the last home which receives 
only what  is left  of the allocated supply. The illustration on the right, in Figure 17, 
shows the new project that was proposed for Jiftlek. Mekorot’s supply would have 
been connected to the central tank, and then distributed outward to the homes in 
Jiftlek. As a result, each household would receive an equitable water supply  from the 
Israeli well. 
 Once the PWA brought this proposal to the JWC, it  was immediately rejected. 
In the time that it took for this to occur, international funding was lost as well. These 
two projects in Jiftlek did not intend to increase the village’s supply, but instead to 
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rehabilitate water pipes and create an efficient distribution system. With a water quota 
already too scant for their needs, the resulting water loss was a major concern.
 Figure 17: Initial “soccer field” distribution vs. proposed distribution.
A member from Jiftlek’s village council commented on their struggles: “Even the 
smallest rehabilitation project needs a license in Area C. You need a license to do 
anything in C, but it is very difficult to get  any license there, even for reducing 
unaccounted for water.”87 
 An additional problem is Israel’s securitization of water resources. Water is  an 
extension of its national security. That is often the underlying purpose for the Civil 
Administration’s rejection of permits. Using the powers of the 1967 military  orders 
that  require permits for all water related installations, Israel monitors and intervenes to 
control all water sector development. 
 An unobstructed path for the international donors would make project 
implementation of the West Bank’s water network an easier process. However, due to 
the little rehabilitation that has taken place since 1967 and the decades old 
infrastructure, donor assistance is stuck in emergency mode, providing only basic 
needs to the Palestinians. Their assistance is invested and reinvested in projects that 
99
87 West Bank and Gaza, 54.
Mekorot
Well
are inherently unsustainable.88 The head of Bardala’s village council commented, “The 
NGOs are only giving us relief and must ask Israelis if they want to implement a 
project, and that even rarely gets approval.”89  He went onto explain that the NGOs 
“are providing the pipes here, but these mean little when there is no water in the 
pipes.”90  But due to the critical conditions of water infrastructure in these areas, the 
PWA and Jordan Valley  depend on donor funding for short-term solutions. The director 
at BirZeit’s Institute of Environmental and Water Studies (IEWS) elaborated further by 
saying, “Each system has a life period. As soon as it needs rehabilitation and 
maintenance and expansion there are not enough funds, and if donations are limited, 
then you say  ‘goodbye water’!”91 It  follows that  extending the life of pipe, by even a 
few months, for example, ensures some level of Palestinian access to water, albeit 
insufficient. 
 The magnitude of political obstacles in the Jordan Valley  has caused 
Palestinian disillusionment for their future. With the suboptimal projects and plans that 
take place, there remains no real recognition of the power dynamics. Issues of water 
are tangled with issues of land, building, agriculture—issues that in their very essence 
affect  Palestinian livelihood. As the resident from Zbeidat remarked, “Lift  the 
occupation and we don’t need the NGOs.”  In order to do that, politics will require a 
significant place in the discussion of West Bank water resources. By eliminating 
critical elements from the solutions that are often opted for, we fail to consider the 
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daily  experiences that truly  speak to the successes and failures of technical 
approaches. 
Rawabi: State-building Without a State
  With the challenges confronting Palestinian areas throughout the West 
Bank, the Rawabi project is an enigma. It is a project that  has tried to move beyond a 
failed peace plan between Israel and Palestine, in hopes of “encouraging private 
investment and creating incentives for development and growth” in the West Bank.92 
Its primary developer, Bashar al-Masri, has gone so far as to say that “despite politics, 
building constructive working relationships with Israelis is vital to building a better 
future for Palestinians.”93  He wants to create not only  a new city, but a new Palestinian 
society, by  working with Israeli businessmen and advisors to see the projects through 
to fruition. However, in the previous chapter, a developer revealed that  Rawabi’s 
success would come at the cost of relinquishing Palestinian claims to refugees and 
right of return. 
 The Rawabi project is an illustrative example that shows the inextricable 
relationship between the final status issues: borders, Israeli settlements, the status of 
Jerusalem, water rights, and lastly, refugees and the right of return. These five issues 
are so contentious that  during previous peace negotiations, discussing them in detail 
has been deferred till the very end.94 
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 The developer from Rawabi discussed the role Israel plays in any development 
that  may occur in the West Bank: “In Area A, according to Oslo, everything is under 
Palestinian Authority  control except water and the limits of the elevations of 
buildings: ... from up and down ... water is a redline. Area A, B, and C isn’t related to 
water. Water is C.”95  The reality on the ground is drastically different from that in 
Rawabi’s publicity. There are political challenges that prevent Rawabi from 
actualizing in the way Palestine’s former Prime Minister Fayyad had imagined. 
 The lack of an obvious water resource is only one of the issues that confront 
the city. The project's future also depends on the Israeli authorities' willingness to grant 
construction for access roads to the city, which would cut through Area C, in close 
proximity to Atarot. The only existing route into the city exists because, after years of 
bureaucratic and high-level diplomatic wrangling, the Civil Administration granted 
Rawabi's developers a permit for a "temporary" road. The road will require renewable 
yearlong permits. Technically, the developers will have to destroy  the road if the 
current permit expires and an extension is not granted. Even if the Israelis agree to 
make the road permanent, one two-lane route, as the proposal stands today, is hardly 
enough for a city expecting to house 45,000 people.96 
Conclusion
 The high rates of water loss (unaccounted-for water) and restrictions on 
Palestinian land access have created obstacles to the development and sustainability of 
Palestine’s water sector. There is a Catch-22 in the rehabilitation and maintenance of 
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Palestinian water resources. While many Palestinian areas try to address the issues of 
water loss in their communities, barriers put in place to restore the networks lead to 
continued water losses. The issue of unaccounted for water only affects only 
Palestinian internal revenue. Israel is unaffected by corresponding financial losses. 
That  way, the burden is continuously put  on Palestinian utilities, creating an increased 
likelihood of tensions within Palestinian communities. The processes by  which 
internal tensions develop between Palestinians themselves will be looked at in further 
detail in the following section.  
 According to a technocratic framework, the issue of unaccounted for water can 
easily  be framed in a way that emphasizes water’s physical rather than political 
valuation. However, when water is given power through its physical association, it is 
also assumed to have its own independent force. This suggests that water is 
autonomous, that it has more power than people and their institutions. However, water 
provision is, fundamentally, a political and social matter, and this becomes clear once 
power is examined at a multiplicity of scales.
“The Palestinian Authority Has No Authority”: 
The Internal Fragmentation of the West Bank Water Sector
“Cooperation based on the current power relationship is little more 
than permanent Israeli domination in disguise.” [Benvenisti, 1995: 232]
 As a means to address the politics that  were obscured by the “technical 
domain” of the water conflict, the Oslo Agreement established two institutions to 
administer the Palestinian water sector. It  transferred responsibility for the water sector 
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to the Palestinian Authority (PA), creating the Palestinian Water Authority  (PWA) and 
established the Joint Water Committee (JWC), a joint Israeli-Palestinian institution, to 
implement Article 40, including water allocation and project appraisal, but only in the 
West Bank. The Palestinian Water Authority  was instituted as an attempt to improve 
the capacities of Palestinians by  supplying the institution they were presumed to lack. 
However, due to the informal distributions of power and influence, politics in the 
water sector became increasingly impenetrable and complex. 
 The fundamental asymmetry  of power, capacity, access to information, and 
interest in the JWC puts into question its status as a truly joint institution. As such, a 
power imbalance, combined with the observed track record of the JWC, has 
contributed to Palestinians’ loss of trust and confidence in their government, and to 
poor outcomes for Palestinian people that undermine the rationale for the committee as 
a “joint’ approach to water sector management.97  Further, the PWA has also been 
hamstrung by the high degree of control that Israel continues to exercise over land and 
water resources in the West Bank. Upon its foundation, the PWA was immediately 
confronted with a set  of formidable challenges, including: a water sector suffering dire 
problems; lack of access to an adequate water supply to meet the population’s needs; a 
near-total dependence on international donors; and, severe restrictions imposed by 
Israel on the type, location, and timing of projects which the PWA is allowed to carry 
out.98  Inevitably, the situation has frustrated the Palestinian Water Authority, as much 
as it  has local Palestinian communities. The result has been heightened internal 
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tensions between the local and nation levels, due to the lack of accountability  and 
reliable services from the government. 
 Moreover, the endorsement of the Oslo agreement, while legitimizing the 
PWA, obliged it to accept three conditions that  would shape the water conflict for the 
foreseeable future: 1) the level of control that the Israeli side had achieved by 1995 
over water in the West Bank; 2) the management of water resources through on 
asymmetrically structured JWC; and, 3) a relationship that appears to have been one of 
subordination from the onset.99  Rather than functioning in a genuinely  cooperative 
way, the framework that was established perpetuated the status quo, but now with a 
newfound legitimacy. 
 The Palestinian Water Minister and head of PWA, Dr. Shaddid Attili, stated 
that  the ongoing water struggle constituted a strong case to revisit Article 40, and to 
establish a fairer joint water coordination and management system. “The problem is 
our whole Oslo agreement,” said Attili. “It’s like a house that hasn’t been fixed for 19 
years. It was only  ever interim. Now we are living in this house, and it’s about  to 
collapse because nothing has been fixed. One of these issues is water.”100  Article 40 
has not been revised since Oslo II in 1995, although it was an interim agreement with 
the intention of being revised within a five-year period.
The Joint Water Committee: A Cooperation Misnomer
 The development of cooperative mechanisms for managing the West Bank’s 
water resources has often been lauded as one of Oslo’s major successes for 
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cooperation. 101  The 1990s, when the Oslo process was taking place, was also a time 
when discourse surrounding Middle East  water politics took a significant shift, as was 
discussed earlier in this thesis. For its proponents, it marked a turn in water relations 
between the two sides. However, positionality  must be taken into consideration when 
looking at accounts of cooperation. 
 Selby argues that routine cooperation between Israeli and Palestinian water 
managers was taking place long before the onset of the Oslo process, and the 
distribution of powers and responsibilities changed little between the pre-Oslo and 
post-Oslo periods. He states that much of what had been patron-client relations under 
the occupation was suddenly discursively  repackaged and represented as instances of 
“cooperation” between the two sides.102
 Selby’s points are evident in the JWC’s most operational feature: its licensing 
procedure, the results of which we have seen in previous chapters. The JWC is unlike 
any other transboundary  resource management scheme because its procedure is not 
only operative on a technical level, but on political and military  levels as well. On a 
technical basis, the powers are distributed evenly  in the committee, with decisions 
based on a consensus process. However, a close examination of the procedural process 
in the JWC reveals the extent of asymmetry that exists in the decision making process.
 Approximately 73 percent of total West Bank territory is designated as Area C, 
under the Civil Administration of the Israel Defense Forces (IDF), and by 2004 an 
additional 6.8 percent had been confiscated by  illegal Israel settlements.103  Both of 
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these areas fall outside of the JWC’s jurisdiction. This leaves only  21 percent of the 
entire Territory subject to formal symmetrical JWC authority. Therefore, for over one 
third of the West Bank, the licensing procedure established a set of norms which 
ensure that Israeli military interests take precedence over both Palestinian 
development and joint Palestinian-Israeli water management interests. 104   Thus, by 
default, the JWU’s process is subject to a power imbalance. 
 As mentioned earlier, the JWC has jurisdiction over water resources in the 
West Bank, not those located within the boundaries of Israel, which reveals the 
committee’s structured inequity even further. The effect of a circumscribed jurisdiction 
structured into the licensing process is considerable. Data sharing, joint monitoring, 
licensing activities and other normal resource management activities do not apply  to 
the transboundary resources located inside Israel, nor to the Israeli settlements located 
inside the West  Bank. As a result, their freshwater consumption and wastewater 
generation rates must be guessed at by the Palestinian side. From a water management 
perspective, sharing only  partial data precludes meaningful use even when it is 
available. 105  Israel gains an effective veto power due to the the JWC’s restricted 
domain. Because water projects that take place in Israel and its settlements are not 
brought to the JWC, there is no equivalent Palestinian veto power.
 The PWA’s power, performance, and capacity  are deeply affected by  the 
asymmetry of information that is available to the Israeli and Palestinian parties. One 
example is its ability  to partake in the Joint Supervision and Enforcement Teams 
(JSETs). Under the Oslo Accords, JSETs were set up to monitor water extraction, but 
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the Palestinian teams no longer take part because they are unable to fully execute their 
role due to Israel’s partial data sharing. Without access to the Israeli settlements and 
limited freedom to enter Area C of the West Bank, where a majority of the wells are 
located, the Palestinian teams cannot fully participate in the JSET activities.106 
 Due to the power imbalance, the Palestinians were left to rely upon the Israeli 
teams for data, with a great deal of information entirely off limits. A chief program 
coordinator for a local development group  reflected on this challenge for the 
Palestinians by saying that “information is very  important; we should know more, but 
it is hard to access the information.”107 Instead, the PWA is in a disadvantaged position 
for water sector planning and management, and cannot access the information needed 
to go forth on water related actions and decisions. Zeitoun uses an allegory  to describe 
the Israel’s restricted domain by saying that attempts at rational water management 
over a series of “islands” on one half of the resource is as impossible and nonsensical 
as managing a few small strands of trees within half a forest.108
 The disproportionate degree of control has also aggravated the internal 
dynamics of the Palestinian water sector. It has essentially left the Palestinian Water 
Authority with little authority  over its own decision making process and thus has 
strictly limited its abilities in Palestinian communities. It  is virtually  impossible for the 
PWA to conduct any integrated planning and management of the resource. At best, its 
role has been reduced to improving water conditions on a short term basis.
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The Internal Fragmentation 
 An impassioned PWA official stated, “We are in a state of crisis management,”  
and, “What the government is doing is ad hoc. We can only give day-to-day  solutions, 
but we are not here for this. We should be here for long-term solutions.”109  In the 
interview, he referred to the inability of the government body to implement an 
integrated water system in the West Bank. With the Israeli measures in place, the PWA 
is able only to address immediate needs or emergency projects for its constituents. The 
PWA official alluded to the possibility that the water specifically allocated to 
autonomous areas of the West Bank was also mismanaged.110  “The Palestinians are to 
blame here,” he said, “but, our water is occupied, our water services are occupied.” 
 Even though the PWA is the regulator and implementer of the Palestinian water 
sector, its role has been compromised by the institutional order that has developed 
though the Oslo process. The water supply  services are in the hands of various local 
bodies, such as village councils and municipalities. The villages in the Jordan Valley 
are theoretically  under PWA responsibility, but remain limited in their capacity  as a 
majority of the land is in Area C. The municipalities were established through legal 
bases that existed before the creation of the PWA, which set them farther apart from 
the national water authority. The physical fragmentation of land resulting from Oslo 
has prevented any resolution to the fractious character of the West Bank’s water sector. 
In fact, it  becomes even more fractious because the resultant “jungle of providers” has 
contributed to internal jurisdiction issues along with conflicting priorities and 
interests.111 
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 Such unclear distinctions between local municipalities, the national 
government, and the Israeli regime inevitably lead one to wonder, who ultimately 
makes decisions about water in the West Bank? As they vie for the authority of 
resources, tensions between the local communities and the national level emerge. The 
former’s lack of confidence in national Palestinian government structures determines 
the kind of relations that exist today. This is owing to the fact that the PWA has neither 
developed a singular water system or regulatory elements in the sector that can ensure 
a cohesive regional model for water supply. 
The Jerusalem Water Undertaking
 With regard to the water sector in Ramallah Al-Bireh, to some extent two 
parties are involved. Importantly, JWU is the sole provider of services. However, 
because the PWA is Israel’s counterpart in the Joint  Water Committee, it  serves as the 
international representative and fundraiser for the Palestinian water sector.112  For this 
reason, the JWU maintains a level of partnership with the PWA, which helps establish 
links to external funds. 
 Still, there is a unique situation between the PWA and JWU that arises because 
of their very different legal foundations. The PWA was established through the Oslo 
process. The JWU was developed before the war in 1966, as a nonprofit  within a 
Jordanian legal framework. During the Oslo process, Jerusalem was declared a final 
status issue, which put it outside PWA jurisdiction for the intended period of the 
interim agreement. Therefore, the PWA is not given any effective authority  over 
Jerusalem or its water issues until a full peace agreement is achieved. 
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 Because the final status issues have been unresolved since 1966, JWU has 
maintained itself as the primary  water supplier for the neighborhoods of East 
Jerusalem. This part of Jerusalem was captured and annexed by Israel in the war of 
1967, and therefore is predominantly  Palestinian. The JWU sought to protect its 
authority over the area and establish itself as the sole water utility for the Palestinians 
in East  Jerusalem.  In order to do this, the utility must first  purchase water from Jehon, 
an Israeli supplier. Then, it  subsidizes the supply  to its customer base in East 
Jerusalem. Although the JWU becomes a middle man in this scenario, it is still able to 
claim a segment of Jerusalem as its own. If the PWA and JWU merged, the former 
would be the senior authority for water issues due to its national governing status. As a 
result, because the PWA is not given claims to Jerusalem until a final agreement is 
reached, the customers in East  Jerusalem would no longer fall under the JWU, a 
Palestinian jurisdiction. Instead, they would fall under Israeli jurisdiction and receive 
their water supply by Jehon, the Israeli utility. 
 According to a manager at the JWU, “Jehon is trying to take control of the 
water supply  to [the Palestinian neighborhoods in East Jerusalem]. This will be a 
political issue.”113   Right now, even though it is more expensive to first purchase from 
Jehon, it  continues to be more important that the Palestinian supply company  not lose 
its customer base to an Israeli company. In this way, the political tensions are much 
more subversive. The JWU is currently subsidizing the water supply to Jerusalem from 
internal revenue. However, due to financial constraints, the JWU is in talks with the 
PWA to cover the subsidy from national funds, so that it  may continue to provide for 
East Jerusalem. 
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 There are two consequences of the current  situation for the Palestinian water 
management sector. On the local level, the internal institutions remain fragmented 
because a unification of the PWA and JWU comes with the loss of Palestinian 
authority over a Palestinian area (East Jerusalem), resulting in additional territory  that 
is directly subject to Israeli providers. That way, there is an incentive for the 
Palestinian institutions to remain fragmented. A framework has emerged that in fact 
deters the PWA and JWU from joining together. Also, the PWA’s role as the organizer 
and regulator of the sector is reduced to one of merely fundraising for the JWU. The 
political situation prevents the PWA from meeting the expectations laid out in the Oslo 
Accords, which were ironically intended to alleviate the challenges.  Although it was 
founded in a perceived time of optimism, the governance structure as it is today has 
eroded the PWA’s capacity building. 
 In the Jordan Valley, tensions between the PWA and local government councils 
are based on the foundation that  the national authority  has not been dependable. With 
little resources provided to local government and growing frustration due to their 
rapidly  increasing isolation in the Jordan Valley, the villages have also not been able to 
fulfill their intended roles. 
The Jordan Valley
“The Palestinian Authority is very weak and cannot help us. 
We are very weak and cannot fight Israel. And the water is not enough. 
What can we do? This is the question in my heart.”
- Nadir Masih, Local Village Council Head, Zbeidat. July 24th, 2012.
 Zbeidat, Jiftlek, and Bardala are all classified as Area B, but are geographically  
separated pockets throughout the Valley, preventing the PWA from creating an 
effectively  planned and integrated water system. The quote above, from Zbeidat’s 
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council head, speaks to his dismay regarding the capacities of Palestinian water 
governance and his unfeigned concern for a solution. He addresses the Palestinian 
Water Authority’s failure to strengthen the foundation of local government and its lack 
of effectiveness in working with the local village councils. A high-ranking official 
from the PWA commented on this point: “Are the LVCs able to manage the water 
supply  based on the situation in which they are living? Unfortunately not. We didn’t 
build a strong institution.”114  Even though the PWA is responsible for water 
management in these areas, it has failed to establish any capacity building programs 
for the villages. The official went on to explain the PWA’s ideal for the local 
government  bodies: “The village councils were part of what we tried to build. Our 
dream was to make a water utility out of the council, but in this area, the conditions 
haven’t let us establish this. Now we can barely even delegate to them.”115 
 With the few capacities that the village councils do have, the PWA feels that it 
has not done enough on a local level to enforce Palestinian payment of water bills. 
“The village council should convince the people to pay, say that they are part of the 
problem, but part of the solution, too” said the PWA official. By  not increasing the 
payment collection efficiency, the PWA is paying the costs of its water debt through its 
value added tax (VAT), which further compromises the Palestinian government’s 
access to revenue that  it could invest in sectors of Palestinian society. There are no 
resources to carry  out  any implementation for payment collection in these areas. The 
councils are an important  partner for the PWA since they are in direct contact with the 
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Palestinian people in the Jordan Valley and could be the most effective conduit for 
getting communities to pay for the water supply.
 With their limited resources, the village councils are unable to perform at full 
potential. A resident and member of the local village council in Zbeidat commented, 
“The head of this LVC is really like the head of the entire half of the Jordan Valley.”116 
During an interview, Zbeidat’s head received a call from Jiftlek’s village council head. 
Jiftlek had lost electricity. Because some communities use electricity to generate water 
pressure, the loss of electricity can be a serious problem. Earlier in this thesis, 
Zbeidat’s village head indicated the concerns that water pumps could have on the 
village. The use of water pumps to generate more pressure affects the electricity that  is 
available for other needs in the village and can create a local crisis. What is critical to 
the case in Jiftlek is that neither village authority knew who was accountable in the 
case of a power loss. The lack of accountabilty is a direct outcome of the extremely 
fragmented nature of the West  Bank’s governing sector. Zbeidat’s head stated, “The 
PA will not help us because we are not paying our bills [and therefore] we heavily rely 
on NGOs [for our power].”117 
  While the PA was not committed to any  development or projects in the Jordan 
Valley, an official from the PWA responded that it  was unable to assist during 
emergencies in the Jordan Valley because of the level of restrictions that were placed 
on the organization by  the Israeli administration. For the same reason, there was little 
possibility  of an emergency proposal to be carried out in a timely manner. In addition, 
because the local village councils were unclear as to who was accountable for Jiftlek’s 
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needs, the heads decided to contact  an NGO in the area, to see if it could provide some 
answers. By chance, my field visit  to the area was organized by  a local Palestinian 
NGO. Therefore, the organizers connected Jiftlek with the NGOs Director General. 
From there, the Director General was able to brainstorm options for who Jiftlek should 
look to as a solution for its power loss. Finally, it submitted an emergency relief 
proposal to an international agency on behalf of Jiftlek. In exactly this way, greater 
reliance upon international donors is created, especially  in the case of short-term relief 
work. In effect, the PWA is left out of the decision process entirely. 
 Building on this, a representative from a local NGO characterized the 
implications of the internal struggles that take place: “Frankly, we are occupied, even 
our Authority is occupied. So, what can we do?”118 There is no unified representation 
of the Palestinian side that would stand for the issues that are taking place. “We have 
no one to frame a discussion from our side” he said. The fragmented governance is a 
direct outcome of the Oslo process, which established an inequitably structured treaty 
and created inequitable arrangements to determine the use of water resources. While 
some areas are integrated into the Israeli system, other areas that fall under PA 
jurisdiction are, in reality, managed by a network of local municipalities. A renowned 
geographer and water scholar from the Hebrew University  commented, “There is no 
[Palestinian] system of carrying water from one place to another, it’s disjointed.”119  It 
is disjointed as a result of those clauses in Oslo that further enshrine Israeli control, 
such as the division of the West Bank into various areas. But the clauses that  may have 
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benefited the Palestinian side, like Israel’s recognition of Palestinian water rights, were 
neglected. 
 
Conclusion
 Mark Zeitoun, a water academic from the London Water Research Group, says 
that  with the legitimacy  of the PWA tied to the agreement, the more powerful side was 
able to structure the JWC so that  it guaranteed the perpetuation of asymmetric water 
distribution. As well, the great success the Israeli side has had in sanctioning the 
discourse that surrounds Palestinian water development efforts, and the conflict in 
general, has cornered the PWA into a position of subordination and subjugation.120 
 The PWA’s weak position prohibits it from achieving a solution to the 
fragmentation of its water sector. In fact, the newly  created structures in Oslo actually 
promote its fractious nature by  creating a situation that prevents the consolidation of 
key Palestinian water governing bodies, such as the PWA and JWU. The undermined 
position of the PWA has further prompted internal struggles in the water sector, further 
engendering a lack of confidence from local communities. Instead of creating genuine 
cooperation over transboundary water issues, inequality of power, freedom, and 
responsibility  between Israeli and Palestinians was reified within the institutional 
order, thereby giving it a newfound legitimacy. 
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CHAPTER V
UNGOVERNABILITY: BY ACCIDENT OR BY DESIGN?
 The preceding chapters concerning physical challenges for the West Bank’s 
water sector, such as Palestinian water supply and high rates of unaccounted-for water, 
highlighted how technical issues have been shaped by  political imperatives. As a 
response to the ongoing complexities of politics, institutions were established between 
Israel and the Palestinian Authority to oversee water provision in the West Bank. 
However, the institutions allowed Israel to qualitatively accumulate more control and 
fragment the Palestinian water sector, contributing to greater internal challenges. I 
intend to explore those in greater detail later. 
 The following two sections illustrate the internal challenges in Palestinian 
society. They also show the ways in which Palestinians have responded to local water 
sector challenges. As a result, Palestinian society is stuck in continuous cycles of 
crisis, leading to ungovernable conditions. The three principal obstacles to a reliable 
water supply  have led to two significant Palestinian responses: (1) refusal from 
Palestinians to make payments on their water bills; and (2) rural to urban migration by 
Palestinian farmers who lack adequate water resources to sustain agrarian lifestyles.  
 The challenges that exist within the Palestinian water sector trigger Palestinian 
responses that are natural to their frustrations. At  the same time, they are stuck in 
perpetual cycles of failure because political circumstances prevent their access to 
sustainable and longterm solutions. The Palestinian responses are unsurprising in light 
of  the conditions that have developed at the community level. However, as we shall 
see, they also have significant implications on the what happens at the national level. 
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Palestinian Debts to Israel: Nonpayment of Water Services
 The technical realities, lack of reliable water supply, and poorly maintained 
water infrastructure, as well as the compromised position of the PWA, have created a 
sense of disillusionment amongst the Palestinians. In reaction to challenges which 
their government has been unable to resolve, they  have stopped making payments to 
the PWA for their water. Consequently, the Palestinian water sector is in debt to 
Mekorot, and in turn, to Israel. As a result, the unpaid Mekorot  invoices are paid by 
Israel, offsetting those charges against the value added tax (VAT) it  collects on 
Palestinian imports. 
 This chapter first provides a brief background on how Israel withholds 
Palestinian taxes, often for extended periods of time, and deducts the costs of its 
services, without first transferring them to the PA. Without tax revenue, the PA is 
unable to be a dependable resource for its people, creating internal strains within 
Palestinian society. Second, it discusses one manifestation of Palestinian response to 
unreliable government services through an examination of the reasons why many 
consumers have stopped making payments. While affordability  is an important factor, 
there are other significant, politically based reasons for why Palestinians choose to 
respond in this way. Lastly, the chapter shows how the influence of power works to 
distort political processes. However, before exploring Palestinian responses in further 
detail, Figure 18 illustrates the conventional payment structure (without  issues of 
debt).
 The municipalities and villages make payments to the Palestinian Water 
Authority, which in turn pays the West Bank Water Department. Within the 
governance structure, the PWA is essentially a top-tier administration that was created 
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during Oslo. It is financially supported by funds from the international donor 
community. The WBWD is still under the authority  of the Civil Administration, and 
the payments it  receives go directly to Mekorot. However, if there is debt from the 
municipalities and villages, the payments are withheld from the VAT, as mentioned 
earlier. 
Figure 18. Palestinian water payment structure.
 The internal dynamics of the Palestinian water sector are deeply affected by the 
lack of internal revenue and consequential debts to Israel. Palestinian consumers are 
withholding payment for the water they receive from the WBWD via their local 
municipalities, village councils, and water utilities. Because the Palestinian water 
sector is now formally  under the purview of the PWA, it is also affected by the lack of 
revenue. The PWA is responsible for paying for the water, including extraction from its 
own wells, as well as the quantity bought from Mekorot, and for the distribution costs 
to its population.1
   Palestinians who have spent years working in the local water sector agree 
that, following the Second Intifada, the situation of nonpaying consumers worsened.2 
One representative from the JWU shared:
  Payers were better obliging until the Second Intifada. The economy 
 suffered, affordability  became a problem, and there has been an 
 accumulation of debt since. It became harder for the Palestinians to pay. We 
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 offered installments, but still, it made little difference. The camps still didn’t 
 pay.3 
! Although he works for the JWC, the representative addressed an issue that is 
typical throughout the West Bank. Poverty  has increased in the territory since 2001, 
shortly after the uprising began, due to harder economic conditions and the impact of 
Israeli-imposed restrictions. Many have been left with little option but to contravene 
the water law in order to deal with severe water shortages, which the PWA has been 
powerless to prevent or overcome. 
 Many of my interviews revealed additional, more nuanced reasons for why  
some Palestinian communities are not  paying, and how some municipalities have tried 
to address the situation within their own areas. In other interviews, the PWA and local 
NGOs expressed understanding for how the political circumstances and Palestinian 
experiences living under occupation have led to their distrust in any future resolution 
of water conflict. While some Palestinians do not pay simply  because they cannot 
afford to, many have made the active choice not to pay  as a way to harness some 
power in a situation in which they feel powerless. 
 The reasons Palestinians are not  paying vary: their frustration with the lack of 
reliability in their water supply; political resistance; or, traditional understandings of 
ownership, which conflict with present day  Israeli policies. As a result of low payment 
rates, the Palestinian water sector struggles to generate enough revenue to cover the 
operating costs of distribution. The revenue shortage is otherwise needed for 
rehabilitating infrastructure or buying additional equipment to meet the growing 
demands of the Palestinian areas. Due to a lack of internal revenue, Palestinian water 
service providers depend on external funds. Villages of the Jordan Valley, due to their 
120
3 Salhoub, Amar. Fieldwork Interview. 
political and social conditions, do not generate enough funds for the rehabilitation of 
networks, ergo their heavy  reliance on international donors. The JWU and Jericho are 
also struggling to generate enough revenue to sustain more than their cost  of 
distribution.4 
   As a result, the unpaid Mekorot invoices are paid by  the PWA through Israel, 
offsetting those charges against the value added tax (VAT) it  collects on Palestinian 
imports.5  As a consequence, the revenue that the PA might collect through its taxes is 
not transferred in its entirety by  Israel. Israel has a history of withholding Palestinian 
tax revenue as a consequence of decisions and actions made by the PA. However, the 
situation is also exacerbated by issues within Palestinian society.
Israel and the Palestinian Authority Tax Revenue
 In November 2012, Palestine made a successful bid to the United Nations to 
upgrade its status from “nonmember observer entity” to “nonmember observer state,” 
providing it a similar status to the Vatican. Palestinians hoped this would provide 
leverage in their dealings with Israel.6  However, since the statehood campaign, Israel 
has openly withheld tax revenues from the PA and claimed to do this until at least 
March 2013 in response to the Palestinian President’s actions.7  Currently, Israel has 
yet to transfer those funds to the PA. Previously, in December 2012 the Israeli Foreign 
Minister, Avigdor Lieberman, declared that, “The Palestinians can forget about getting 
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even one cent in the coming four months, [then] we will decide how to proceed.”8 
Almost thirty European Union ministers criticized this response from Israel and noted 
that  under the Paris Protocol of 1994, and later at Oslo II of 1995, “contractual 
obligations, regarding full, timely, predictable and transparent  transfer of tax and 
custom revenues have to be respected.”9 The Paris Protocol was an annex of a larger 
agreement between Israel and the Palestinian Authority, which governed economic 
relations between the two sides. Later, in 1995 the Protocol was incorporated into the 
Oslo II Accords.
 The withheld taxes are also used by Israel to pay off money that Palestinians 
owe to its Electric cooperation, as well as its water authority. Just a few months ago, 
the Israeli Finance Minister announced that “NIS 450 million ($120 million) in tax 
revenues that were to be transferred to the Palestinian Authority  would instead be used 
to offset PA debts [...].” Many media sources and critics claimed that this move was a 
punitive measure against Palestine’s UN bid.10 A similar occurrence took place in 2011 
when Israel froze payments to the PA following UNESCO’s approval for Palestine’s 
full membership. 
  As Israel withholds taxes as a punitive measure and tool to collect debts, 
Palestinian society is also affected internally. As the tax revenues are not  transferred to 
the PA, the Authority  does not  have the cash to pay  public sector salaries. These effects 
on income have led to strikes by teachers and health workers in the Territory who have 
become frustrated with their delayed and inconsistent salaries. As a result, there is a 
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great deal of despondency  about the PA from its people. Disillusionment has 
contributed to the refusal of Palestinians to pay their bills, which creates a cyclical 
problem. The Authority  has been unable to provide consistent salaries, water supply, or 
donor successes in the West Bank. As a result, the government’s failure to provide for 
the Palestinians has led to heightened frustration within society. On the other hand, 
when the PA does not receive its taxes, its prospects for the financial autonomy  and 
viability of the Palestinian water sector are undermined.11 
The Jerusalem Water Undertaking 
 Over the last forty-five years, the JWU has accumulated a debt of almost 
NIS110 million (approximately $40 million) of unpaid water bills. But, through some 
recent innovations in collection procedures, the utility  has managed to collect  NIS10 
million through settlements with consumers. The JWU stated that current revenues are 
only enough to cover its operating costs. International funding is directed mostly 
towards the maintenance of networks.12 
 The refugee camps, under JWU jurisdiction, are one component that  influence 
the utility’s low collection rate. While the camps do make payments, their rates are 
significantly  lower, as seen in refugee camps throughout the West Bank. This has 
created friction between the utility company and the camps. The former attempts to 
resolve debt issues in its jurisdictions in order to meet growing needs in Ramallah Al-
Bireh, while refugees have learned to be pessimistic after decades of fruitless debate 
about their status and rights. According to the municipality, UNRWA is able only to 
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pay for water in its own facilities within the camps, such as the schools or community 
centers, not for the water use taking place within individual Palestinian households. 
Those additional costs are sometimes covered by international donors, while the 
remainder is deducted by Israel from the PA’s tax revenues. 
 The JWU has hosted and continues to host workshops in the camps to raise 
awareness of the challenges of low payment rates, and aims to established direct 
relationships with the customers. Despite that, consumers still resist. One of the 
workshop coordinators shared that, “They often tell us ‘improve our living condition 
and we will pay, or switch places with us and then see what happens.’”13 The refugees 
have found themselves living in a permanently  temporary life, one that is increasingly 
marginalized and impoverished. Their places in the camps were only meant to be 
temporary. But now, instead of tents and shacks scattered around dirt paths, cementlike 
structures stand tall, appearing like mini-cities. Camp refugees’ frustration comes with 
living in these circumstances. One way in which that frustration manifests itself is 
through Palestinians’ refusal to pay into a system that has let them down.
 As we saw in chapter 2, the JWU suffers from a high rate of nonrevenue or 
unaccounted-for water (UFW). In addition to real or physical losses, which result from 
poor infrastructure, the JWU also faces the issue of apparent losses. These losses occur 
through illegal connections made to the water network. Currently, the JWU has two 
teams that are in the process of negotiating agreements with the Palestinian police and 
courts, to promote better enforcement and monitoring of situations like these.14
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 Yet, there are local stories of anger and frustration. In the summer, when the 
weather is especially hot, the water supply is even more strained and the Palestinians 
struggle to find ways of subsisting. Their gardens suffer and many have to closely 
monitor when and how much water they are using. A local Palestinian told me about a 
well he and his family constructed on their property, in order to store additional water 
from the utility: 
  [We] had to secretly  build this during the night and [we] did get caught a few 
 times, but  what else can we do? Some of my brothers went to jail. But this is 
 better than having no water. Sometimes life throws circumstances at us, 
 causing us to prioritize the most difficult options.15
! His family  has made an illegal structure to store water as a way  of 
circumventing unreliability. While he recognizes the paradox of going against “his 
own side,” for a Palestinian without a reliable water supply the distinction between the 
JWU and Israel is irrelevant. When a Palestinian doesn’t pay a water bill or builds an 
illegal well, the JWU is immediately confronted by the consequences. If a water bill is 
not paid, the utility loses the ability to generate internal revenue. From an illegal well, 
the JWU faces the repercussions of building illegally in its jurisdiction. 
 Palestinians are not paying for their water supply for reasons beyond 
affordability. The PWA, while also affected by recurring debts, commented with 
surprising candor: “Due to the circumstances arising from lack of sovereignty, the 
Palestinians look to protect themselves.”16  Self-reliance is another reason for low 
collection rates in the West Bank. After living through decades of conflict, Palestinians 
have seen little improvement in their conditions. Therefore, many have lost faith in 
their government institutions and also, in this case, the Palestinian service providers.
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 As for the JWU, rather than cutting off the water supply, it has turned to 
institutional enforcement. The JWU has the highest collection efficiency, with 96%, 
among West Bank municipalities. It is also currently trying to develop  a framework for 
other Palestinian areas. In October 2011, JWU began negotiations for an agreement 
with the local police and courts. The agreements focused on enforcement tools, such as 
one that prohibits Palestinians from leaving the West Bank for international travel 
unless their dues were paid in full to the utility. The JWU quotes five various cases 
from the Ramallah Al-Bireh area in which families were leaving for their umrah, the 
Islamic pilgrimage to Saudi Arabia, but were told to return to the municipality and 
settle payments.17 
 If the debts are not settled with the JWU, the company resorts to cutting off 
water services and giving Palestinians the option to go to court, letting the judicial 
process decide the appropriate steps.18  The JWU rarely  cuts off supply to its 
consumers. While it is not a formal law, the director of the Palestinian Hydrology 
Group, the largest Palestinian NGO focusing on water and sanitation, explains that it  is 
rather a “customary  law, one that is not officially  in the books, but according to the 
customs and usual practices.”19  In other words, it has not been a conventionally used 
enforcement tool. 
 Nonetheless, relying on legal institutions to assist in the reclamation of debt is 
still a challenge. A representative from the JWU administrative department  explained 
that  because “the courts are usually  on the peoples’ side, because water [is seen] as 
essential, they  rule in favor of the Palestinians.” He continued, “But, it’s a long process 
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and people don’t have time for this [...] so they  prefer to deal with the municipality 
instead of the courts.”20  
 If a case does go to court and it is decided that the consumer is at fault, a court 
order is given to make the payment. At this point a new level of confrontation arises. 
Given that a consumer lives in East Jerusalem, an area best compared with Area C in 
the West Bank due to Israel’s de facto annexation, the (Palestinian) court order ought 
to be enforced by  the Israeli police. This can create severe antagonism between 
Palestinian consumers and their water service providers. This situation often arises, 
due to the area JWU serves; therefore, enforcing payments through court is often 
unsuccessful. 
 Next, we turn to the issues of payment collection in Jericho. Its case shows that 
disillusionment in national politics has effected Palestinians internally and throughout 
the West Bank. Such disillusionment manifests itself in Jericho, like it  has in Ramallah 
Al-Bireh, as well as in the Jordan Valley. The lack of trust that Palestinians have in 
their government has effected society on the most basic and local levels.
The City of Jericho
 As a consequence of population and economic growth in Jericho, there has 
been an increase in demand on the city’s domestic water supply  over the past decade. 
This pushes the municipality  to provide extra amounts of water at  the cost of spring 
water that is initially allocated for agricultural purposes.21 As water consumption in the 
city increases, its internally generated revenue remains stagnant. Although we have 
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already seen that Jericho struggles to implement long-term changes in its water sector, 
revenue provides the city with an income to preserve itself.
 The head of Jericho’s Revenue and Collections department stated that the city  
is currently  at  a 60% collection rate for water bills.22  He identified two primary 
reasons for the low rate: 1) affordability; and, 2) the culture and people’s mindset of 
not paying for what Palestinians believe to be “public property.”23  These notions of 
water as a public good are similar to those in the Jordan Valley with the Mejelle 
system. The head of the municipality’s water department added, “There is a big gap 
between the public and government. People do not trust the municipality.”24 
 According to the Jericho Master Plan, put  together by the Palestinian 
Hydrology  Group, a large proportion of the population in Jericho is considered 
financially vulnerable due to low income levels.25  This is especially the case in the 
refugee camps, such as the Aqbat Jabr camp. The revenue from within the city, 
excluding refugee camps, is only  sufficient to meet  minimal operational needs. The 
remaining costs need to be met by  external agencies. This is similar to the situation in 
Ramallah-Al Bireh.
 Although cutting off the water supply  to consumers could be considered an 
effective enforcement  tool, the Jericho municipality explained that, “We’re a social 
body, one elected by the people, [so] we cannot just turn off our own peoples’ water.”26 
128
22 Sharif, Baha’a. Fieldwork Interview. 1 Aug 2012. 
23 Sharif, Baha’a. Fieldwork Interview. 
24 Bsharat, Jalal. Fieldworkd Interview. 20 Jul 2012. 
25 Palestinian Hydrology Group (PHG). Draft Master Plan for Jericho. Copy acquired through 
personal correspondence with Jericho Municipality official, Jalal Bsharat. 1 Aug 2012, 59.
26 Bsharat, Jalal. Fieldwork Interview.  
The municipality also fears that by cutting off water supply it will create more distrust 
between the city and its people.
 “We cannot turn off the water, but we are allowed to collect money  from the 
people, using the court  as a mediator,” shared an official from the city’s water 
department. “But the problem here is our inability to enforce the court orders.” As a 
social body, elected by  the people, the municipality's incumbency is also confronted 
with the prospect of losing support, by sending its constituency to court. 
 In order to address issues of nonpayment, several changes would be required, 
such as reconfiguring and increasing the current  water tariff, so that consumers would 
discipline their consumption. According to the city’s Master Plan, the tariff structure 
would be adjusted based upon a comprehensive evaluation of the socioeconomic 
circumstances of the city  residents and the Municipality’s cost recovery objective.27 
The current block tariff system does not  address the actual cost of water supply  and 
was not defined to address future needs.28  The current tariff block structure is 
summarized in Figure 19.
 It is a problematic tariff block structure because the consumption ranges are too 
broad, which results in 78% of Jericho falling in the first block category. The first 
block category is merely NIS1/cubic meter ($0.27/m3). This is the lowest water rate 
out of all the Palestinian administered regions of the West Bank. With an already 
inadequate collection rate, coupled with the low price for water, the chances for 
Jericho’s water department to generate necessary revenues are low. 
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Figure 19: Jericho’s current tariff structure, adapted from the Palestinian Hydrology 
Group.
 Nonetheless, the municipality  official explained that the “city  feels frustrated 
with the mayor. Due to politics, he won’t  change the tariff system. As a consequence, 
we are suffering in the water department because how can we tell people to [pay] for 
water, when we are [practically] giving it to them for free?”29  While he offers a 
worthwhile point, in the twist of politics and lack of enforcement tools in Jericho city, 
it is difficult for the city to increase its collection rate. Thus, Jericho has internal 
revenue problems for its own city  but also faces the challenges of minimal collection 
from the Mekorot supplied areas in its jurisdiction, like the Jabr camp. These issues 
require that  Jericho rely on external sources to cover anything beyond operational 
costs. 
 The director of the Institute of Environmental and Water Studies (IEWS) at 
BirZeit University  stated, “If the cost and service of water supply  and distribution is 
not met, the feasibility and sustainability  of the water network is threatened.”30 The 
utilities and local village councils need revenues through tariffs as well as international 
donations and aid. Currently, the operations costs are covered by a narrow margin, but 
130
29 Bsharat, Jalal. Fieldwork Interview. 20 Jul 2012.
30 Abu Mahdi, Maher. Fieldwork Interview. 28 Aug 2012. 
the investment costs are provided by external resources. However, the director 
commented that if increasing tariffs is the goal, it is mostly low income communities 
that  will be affected. They are already adopting coping strategies such as purchasing 
additional water from tankers. Rather than paying for coping strategies, household 
funds would just be redirected to higher tariffs. He argued that there was little benefit 
to increasing the tariff, because there is still no guarantee of higher collection rates.31 
The low recovery rates could remain despite an increase in tariffs. 
 The debt issue deeply affects the resources that the PWA has to invest in the 
water sector. It  further inhibits the Palestinian government from having any  significant 
influence on the decisions that take place on a state level, between themselves and 
Israel, because they are in a subordinate position. As a result, the Palestinians see their 
government  as subject to the laws of an occupying force and recognize their own 
powerlessness.
 The head of Jericho’s water department suggested that  it was not only  a money 
issue: “Sure, the PWA is paying, but there is still not enough water [for Palestinians]. It 
is not  that you pay  more and then you get more. It is not like this. It has been a fixed 
quota since Oslo.”32 For the city, Aqbat Jabr camp faces difficulties in getting enough 
water to meet the community’s needs. Other West Bank areas that depend on 
Mekorot’s water supply are also confronted by this challenge. The comments of the 
head of Jericho’s water department reveal why many Palestinians resist making 
payments to the water sector. There is little initiative for them to contribute positively 
to a water sector that already does not meet their needs.
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The Jordan Valley
“You are occupying me and you are asking me to pay you
... the cost of your occupation?”
-Nadir Masih, Head of Zbeidat’s Local Village Council, July 24th, 2012
 Among the several village council heads whom I interviewed, there was 
unanimous agreement that the villages were not paying their water bills. Palestinian 
water supply  is abstracted from underground aquifers that  lie beneath the valley, by 
Mekorot. The Israeli company then sells the water back to the Palestinians at 
additional costs, which include pumping, transfer, and so forth. The problem is that 
Israel has taken local authority away from the Palestinians to drill their own wells, 
develop  their own water resources, and establish their own water networks. So in place 
of self-sufficiency, they are paying full cost for their water supply, one that is already 
subjected to strict quotas.
 Another challenge for the Palestinians in the Jordan Valley  is the disparity 
between themselves and Israeli settlers. The visual presence of seemingly  abundant 
water resources and Israel’s social incentives in the settlements create a psychic 
struggle for Palestinians for whom those resources are inaccessible and unavailable. 
The subsidized water irrigation systems that allow settlements to increase their 
agricultural production at a cheaper rate is in sharp contrast to the conditions of 
Palestinian production. 
 Since shortly  after 1967, the Israeli administration defined certain occupied 
territories as “National Priority Areas” (NPAs), where it aims to expand its population 
within those areas. Although illegal by  international law, Israeli citizens in NPAs are 
entitled to specific benefits under Israeli law. The entirety of the West Bank has been 
designated as such, by Israel. The government gives its citizens within NPAs 
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subsidized housing and education, in addition to industrial, agricultural, and touristic 
benefits as incentives to live in the area.  
 With no support from their own government, and no privileges of citizenship, 
Palestinians are constantly navigating through vulnerable conditions. Their agricultural 
sector is one example. Palestinian agriculture is subject to a restricted water supply 
and limitations on agricultural equipment. Its access to the market is also affected by 
checkpoint delays. Due to road restrictions, produce delivery  trucks must take 
circuitous routes, which either damages the produce during transfer, or costs more to 
sell than Israeli produce. A member of the PWA admitted, “[Palestinians] are not 
paying in the Jordan Valley, [we] recognize this. Israel provides social insurance to the 
settler communities, something that we are not able to do for our people.”33  The power 
differential between Israel and the PA remains, and thus so does the PWA’s inability  to 
make any  real contribution. Consequently, Palestinians have become especially 
resistant to the PA, due to its lack of efforts in the area and to the visible contrast in 
their own sense of livelihood versus those of the settlers. 
 Further, due to the “artificial amputation” of the Jordan Valley, as referred to by  
the Ma’an Development group in Ramallah, it is nearly impossible for the Palestinians 
to function in a cohesive and effective manner.34  The Palestinian villages are 
obstructed by forty-three Israeli settlements, and checkpoints, combined with Israeli 
military  and free-fire zones, all considered off limits to the Palestinians.35  These 
villages are increasingly  isolated from other Palestinian areas in the Jordan Valley and 
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elsewhere in the West Bank, and their condition is essential in determining Palestinian 
frustrations, causing them to retreat from a system occupying them. They are living in 
a situation that is often referred to as the “microcosm” of Israeli occupation.36  The 
Palestinian villages in the JV are little pockets of land disconnected from one another, 
and suffocated by Israel’s NPAs and other strategic military areas. As an academic in 
environmental conflict  at Hebrew University  said, “The Jordan Valley  is perceived as 
Israeli territory  by  many Israelis,” and therefore the Palestinians are relegated to 
second-class status.37
 With absolute loss of Palestinian autonomy and self-determination, “we are not 
paying!” was the frequent chant recited by many local Palestinians and members of the 
local village councils. The Jordan Valley is one of the key agricultural areas in the 
region. With the climate, fertile soil, and water resources (as a result of the 
underground aquifers), the valley  is most conducive to production. But, no Palestinian 
areas receive such worthwhile benefits because limited access to water. 
 Before 1967, Palestinians were permitted to build wells and maintain their 
water infrastructure in order to access the water resources. Having gone through 
various stages of rule—Ottoman, Jordanian, and now Israeli—the  transition of 
practicing ownership  rights has also created problems for the ways that Palestinians 
culturally  understand ownership  versus their Israeli counterparts. My intention is not 
to make a culturalist assumption that claims that prestate perceptions stand in the way 
of modern water management practices, or that the Palestinian community, due to its 
traditional ideas, is not equipped to deal with the new circumstances. Rather, the point 
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is to show how Palestinian traditions have been swept aside as a result  of 
dispossession. Water had never previously been as strongly regulated until the creation 
of the Israeli Water Law in 1959, which signaled a major policy shift  from prestate 
legal doctrines.38 
 The pre-state doctrine, Mejelle, was established under the Ottoman rule and 
constituted part of Palestine’s legal code under the British Mandate. It also remained a 
part of Israel’s legal code until it was eventually repealed in the 1950s.  The Mejelle 
built  itself on Islamic notions of gratuitous property  rights, Water, like grass and air, 
was declared a free natural resource, owned by  the public. Water resources were not 
absolute in the Mejelle because river and groundwater could not  themselves be owned. 
However, it did permit that a well or  portion of a river existing on a specific property 
belonged to the owner of that  property. Based on his roots in the Mejelle tradition, the 
head of Zbeidat’s village council fervently stated, “It’s under my feet and [the Israelis] 
just dig it from the ground! This water, it’s right here,” he said as he pointed to the 
ground, “and you’re telling me to pay you?”39  Today, water is no longer in 
Palestinians’ control, but strongly centralized under the occupying state, and they  are 
unable to dictate how or when their water is supplied. 
 In Bardala, the village council was forthright about not paying for its water 
supply. With the PWA’s accumulated debt, in part from villages such as his, when 
asked about the village’s relationship to the water authority  the council’s head stated, 
“No, they are not helping us. They are not  doing anything but telling us to pay. Okay, 
135
38 Alatout, Samer. “State-ing natural resources through law: the codification and articulation of water 
scarcity and citizenship in Israel.” Arab World Geographers. 10.1 (2007): 16-37, 24.
39 Masih, Nadir. Fieldwork Interview. 24 Jul 2012.
we will pay, but first give us our deserved supply and even then, we will only pay  for 
the supplying of water, like pumping and the infrastructure.”40 
 In the previous chapter, the issue was that  village councils were not given the 
appropriate resources from their national government to fully realize their potential. 
While that is true, there is also a level of apathy from village councils, due to their 
frustration with the PA, thereby creating disincentive for the councils to enforce 
payment from the consumers. 
 In addition, due to the strict  quotas in place for domestic and agricultural water, 
the village head showed his dissatisfaction of an inadequate supply, which is 
aggravated by  water losses from an ill-maintained water network. The obstacles are 
unlikely to foster optimism amongst Palestinians. He also admitted that while he and 
his community  would pay for water, they would never fathom paying for the actual 
water, but  only for the system supplying it. His point reflected the differing 
perceptions and cultural outlooks with respect to the water issues between Israel and 
Palestine, which were a recurrent theme throughout my various interactions with 
informants in the Jordan Valley.
A Subsidy Analogy: An Indicator for Power
 The debt issue within the Palestinian water sector highlights the lack of 
Palestinian sovereignty. The way in which Israel withholds taxes from the PA serves as 
a measure for the power inequality  that exists between the two sides. In a context 
without coercion, a portion of the PWA’s tax revenues is put towards the cost of 
Palestinian water supply in the West Bank. According to the ideas of basic economic 
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theory, this process functions as a subsidy from the government. However, it  cannot be 
a subsidy without sovereignty, which remains the missing piece. The point is not to 
make an obvious observation, but instead to show the way in which distortions occur 
under occupation. What could be a simple subsidy from the PWA to its people is rather 
a means for sustaining a power imbalance.
 The Palestinian government’s taxes are technically going towards ensuring 
water supply  in the West Bank. But, because the PA is not actively choosing to do this 
from within its own government, it sets it apart from a subsidy. Instead, the debts are 
withheld from the PA by the Israeli state. In practice, the Palestinian Authority has 
accepted that its taxes be taken from the VAT. They  have accepted this as a de facto 
policy  because, as a government, with its role as a provider of social services, the PA 
continues to purchase water in bulk from Mekorot, in order to maintain Palestinian 
water supply. The situation reflects the PA’s perception of water as a basic right, but 
also, if it withholds supply for the Palestinians, it becomes a facilitator to Israel’s use 
of water as a tool to reinforce an inequitable power dynamic. 
 As the PA’s tax revenues are withheld from Israel to cover water debts, the 
scenario plays out like a system of government subsidy. However, the underlining and 
fundamental difference remains: the absence of Palestinian sovereignty and lack of 
agency. The geopolitical influence of the conflict has created a situation where loss of 
Palestinian revenue is a matter of subjugation. It is not an active decision made by the 
PA with Palestinian interests as the foremost consideration, but rather a matter of 
circumstance.
 It is a generally understood principle that the parties involved in giving and 
receiving subsidies will benefit long term. For example, when Israel provides settlers 
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with subsidies as an incentive to move to the West Bank, both parties are benefiting. 
Israel is populating communities in the West Bank as a strategic move. The settlers are 
receiving social services from the government that provide them access to resources 
otherwise too expensive inside Israel. For example, a member of Israel’s Jordan Valley 
Regional Council quoted, “It is still cheaper to build a house in the Jordan Valley, 
cheaper than anywhere else.”41  For this member, “anywhere else” refers to the state of 
Israel. In fact, an op-ed piece in the New York Times by both an Israeli journalist and a 
Palestinian journalist discusses Israel’s investment of its public construction budget: 
much of the lack of affordable housing in Israeli cities can be traced back to the 1990s, 
when the availability of public housing in Israel was severely  curtailed while subsidies 
in the settlements increased, driving many lower-middle-class and working-class 
Israelis into the West Bank and Gaza Strip—along with many  new immigrants.42 
Therefore, the subsidies meet the interests of the Israelis migrating into the West Bank 
and the Israeli government.
 The situation for the Palestinian Authority differs quite radically. It is a subsidy 
in the sense that the PA has accepted that its revenue be withheld in order to supply 
water to its people. In the long term however, the Palestinians and their government 
are suffering the consequences. Israel’s withholding of PA revenue contributes to 
Palestine’s powerlessness and loss of agency  in determining how funds are allocated. 
It is a worthwhile metaphor that illustrates circumstances of sovereignty vis-a-vis 
subjection. 
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 If the PA were autonomous in its dealings, it would be the sole party in 
determining how subsidies are given to assist municipalities and village councils. 
Rather than the Israelis deducting funds from the VAT, the PA would intentionally  allot 
money toward Palestinian water supply. However, the situation as it is today is a 
matter dictated by Israel.43
 A Palestinian water scholar suggested that the PWA declare an “optimal tariff,” 
as a means for Palestinians to reclaim control of at least the debt crisis and Israel’s 
withholding of debt from VAT revenue. That would require the PWA to identify two 
values: one for the optimal tariff and another based on the consumer’s affordability. 
His idea was that an optimal tariff should be constructed based on credible social, 
economic, cost recovery, and environmental criteria. The second value would be 
determined based on the amount being paid by the Palestinian consumers and the 
extent to which cost would be enforceable. The difference between the optimal tariff 
and enforceable payment is what should be absorbed by the Palestinian Authority.44
 An optimal tariff allows the Palestinian government to gain credibility  with the 
Palestinians, and could possibly serve as a form of “social insurance” in some 
capacity. It does not address the situation of nonpayers in its entirety, but it enables the 
PA to reclaim some “symbolic” agency in the process. As there is already little 
confidence in the Palestinian Authority, such measures could work towards 
diminishing the gap between the local Palestinian population and the national 
authority.
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Conclusion
 Palestinian resistance to pay  for water supply illustrates the importance of how 
a local issue implicates the various levels of society, eventually  exacerbating the 
interactions between Israel and the PA. From the local household’s refusal to pay for 
water, the issue becomes an area of contention between the two sides, beginning at  a 
micro-level but affecting the macro-level. When individual households do not pay 
their water bills, the debt  contributes to an issue at the community  level. As a result, 
the municipalities and local village councils struggle to generate enough income to 
fully  realize their capacities. While the Palestinian consumers remain frustrated due to 
their strenuous conditions, the utilities try to provide a water supply without the ability 
to utilize effective governance techniques, which in turn can foster internal tension. At 
the state level, the PWA’s debts further aggravate its relationship  with Israel, which 
deducts the outstanding payments from the Palestinian tax revenues. Consequently, 
debt is an additional trigger to prolong tensions between two sides. Ultimately, the 
problems at the household level continue, due to political and socioeconomic 
conditions resulting from the conflict between Israel and the PA, creating a 
fundamentally cyclical problem.  
 
Creating Place for the Displaced: The Challenges of Palestinian Rural to 
Urban Migration
“As a Palestinian, I would prefer to buy Israeli tomatoes because they are cheaper 
[than Palestinian tomatoes]. We don’t have a subsidy - that is our fault. [The 
government] should subsidize in response to the struggle. Our farmers will leave 
because they are investing and investing, but losing.”
- Yousef Najjar, member of the Palestinian Water Authority, July 8th, 2012
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 The agricultural sector of the West Bank, especially  in the Jordan Valley, has 
suffered as a direct result of the high degree of control that  Israel continues to exercise 
over land and water resources. This section expands upon the current conditions facing 
Palestinian farmers. Not only  is there a growing inability  for Palestinian farmers to 
engage in sustainable agriculture, but as we saw in Bardala, the availability of arable 
land is also decreasing. The Palestinian farmers are unable to compete with Israel’s 
subsidized water, tax breaks, and cheap land on its expanding agricultural settlements 
in the Jordan Valley.45  For this reason, there is an outward migration of Palestinian 
farmers from the Jordan Valley into either urban settings or Israeli settlements looking 
for work. The latter portion of this chapter consists of a reflection on the increasing 
scale of migration into Ramallah Al-Bireh and Jericho, which has created pressures on 
the cities’ systems.
 Agriculture is one of the main means of livelihood for the Palestinian people 
and takes on significant economic, social, and political roles within their communities. 
It provides food security  and contributes to poverty  reduction, especially in rural areas 
such as the Jordan Valley. For many Palestinians, agriculture is a primary source of 
cultural pride and emphasizes the connection they feel to the land. Agricultural activity 
has also stood as a symbol against  the occupation by creating a psychological hope 
related to retention of Palestinian land.46  Politics are embedded into the Palestinian 
means of livelihood because, with its loss comes the loss of Palestinian presence in 
rural areas. Since Palestinian farmers are paying higher costs for their production 
while Israeli agriculture is subsidized, they are invariably placed at a competitive 
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disadvantage. As a consequence, Palestinians are leaving the agricultural sector and 
looking for work in the service industry or searching for manual labor in surrounding 
settlements. Those who are determined to remain in the agricultural sector are moving 
into Palestinian urban centers categorized as Area A, as the irrigation restrictions there 
are less limiting. Although a common perception that there are more resources in 
urban centers, areas such as Jericho are already struggling to meet the needs of their 
consumer base. 
 In the opening of this section, a member of the PWA commented on the 
conditions of Palestinian agriculture. It  is ironic that a Palestinian government official 
would reveal the advantages of purchasing Israeli produce, but in reality, quality 
produce is more affordable when bought from the Israeli farmers, many of whom are 
based in the Jordan Valley. The inability  to access sufficient resources for field 
irrigation presents many barriers to the Palestinian agricultural sector. Since they are 
prevented from building new wells, reconditioning existing wells, and digging deeper 
wells near springs, Palestinian farmers do not have enough water to irrigate their 
fields. Furthermore, Israeli farmers are receiving water at subsidized costs. For 
example, a case study conducted by the World Bank concluded that an Israeli farmer is 
paying an average of NIS 0.6 per cubic meter of water, while a Palestinian farmer pays 
between NIS 4 and NIS 12 shekels for the same quantity.47  In this way, the Israeli 
tomatoes that the government official refers to serve as a metaphorical representation 
of the crisis that confronts Palestinian agriculture and the consequent displacement of 
farmers from agricultural areas. 
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 Of all the agricultural land in the West Bank, 62.9% of it is located in Area C, 
most of which is in the Jordan Valley  where Palestinians are unable to expand their 
production. They are often required to obtain special permits to cultivate.48  “The 
farmers are moving to work in the settlements,” admitted the water authority’s 
representative, “and it’s the government’s fault here. We should support  the people 
there. We are only giving the farmers promises after promises.”49 As mentioned earlier, 
Palestinian residents of the Jordan Valley have lost faith in their leaders to be able to 
provide them the resources to build resilient communities. They look to their Authority 
in hopes that it  will be able to build a foundation like Israel has for its settlers. Instead, 
there are no resources that the Palestinian government can provide to its agricultural 
sector. While Israel destroys the capacities of Palestinian communities to expand in the 
sector, it also provides the next reliable source of income through settlement labor.50 
 In Jiftlek and Bardala, agricultural needs are especially  affected by  the 
insufficient supply of water and Israeli policies curtailing Palestinian access to the 
markets. Because there is little potential for Palestinian markets to flourish, 
Palestinians from these areas in particular are either looking to settlements for work or 
migrating out of the villages. The head of Jiftlek’s village council explains how many 
cases of migration take place: “The farmers are going to [the cities] because the land 
there is Palestinian controlled, it’s easier to buy there, and the distance for tankers to 
travel is less, so it’s more affordable.”51  However, due to the nature of the economy in 
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the cities, it is less likely  that migrants can sustain their livelihoods through agriculture 
entirely. For that reason, many migrants make the change to working in the service 
sector.  
 If the Palestinian farmer chooses to purchase additional water from tankers for 
agricultural use, transportation costs are significantly higher in the Jordan Valley than 
in the urban center. As I mentioned earlier, the Jordan Valley is incredibly isolated and 
for a tanker to reach a Palestinian village, it would have to pass through various 
checkpoints and military crossings, making it a longer and more expensive journey. It 
would be cheaper to deliver the tanker water to Area A cities as they are more 
accessible to the West Bank’s road network.
 In the Jordan Valley, while all the houses are located in Area B, a majority  of 
the farmland is located in Area C.52  Among the population, there are demands for 
additional housing due to the extended family structures that exist, but there is little 
space to expand. “All the houses are in Area B, but there is no more room to build 
without encroaching into agricultural Area B,” explained a local official from Jiftlek.53 
As a result, the Area B that  was once used for agriculture is converted into space to 
build more homes, similar to what has happened in Zbeidat. Another member of the 
village council explained:
 The problem is that the agricultural land in area B has the most [relative] 
 autonomy, [we] can build irrigation systems, structures, get  better tools and 
 equipment [...] to sacrifice this more autonomous area of land [is] not an easy  
 compromise for the local community.54 
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However, sacrificing better arable land to build more homes also means that 
Palestinians are forced to cultivate under more difficult  circumstances or to choose 
leaving their villages in hopes of finding alternative means of income in the cities. The 
restrictions placed on farmers in Area C are extensive. They are unable to cultivate 
without first  obtaining permission from the Civil Administration. If they do not 
relinquish Area B agricultural land, then the villages are unable to create more living 
space according to their needs. Both scenarios contribute to outward migration.  
 In Bardala, the head of the village council told me: “Water is the most 
important to us. We will leave it if doesn’t get better because then there is nothing left 
for us.”55 He went on to tell me that  as cultivatable land decreased due to the shortage 
of water supply, many people in Bardala also left for different Palestinian cities outside 
of the West Bank.56  “Even the land we have here is too much for the amount of water 
that  is available to us. We don’t have enough water to make use of the land that we do 
have.”57 In this way, Palestinian land in the Jordan Valley  is shrinking due to the lack 
of resources available to sustain itself. On one level, land has been explicitly 
confiscated in the Jordan Valley  and declared an Israeli security zone, but what the 
Palestinians are left with is, for all intents and purposes, also confiscated due to the 
imposed restrictions on water supply. 
 An official from the Palestinian Water Authority explained his perspective on 
the situation: “Palestinians are an obstacle to the Israelis, especially in the Jordan 
Valley. Israelis are letting people evacuate themselves in the Jordan Valley, by  creating 
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conditions causing them to leave ... applying all constraining measures.”58 Rather than 
migrating due to explicit force, the circumstances are such that force manifests itself in 
latent forms. The entirety of surrounding land in the valley, which Palestinians 
previously farmed, is now an enclosed Israeli enclave. The checkpoints that rest 
between these two Area B and Area C designations create challenges for the farmers, 
who sell their produce outside of the Jordan Valley because they create delays in the 
transportation of goods. 
 With the frustrating conditions and limited options for livelihood in rural areas 
of the Jordan Valley, Palestinians look elsewhere for work. Those who are not going to 
the settlements are moving into Palestinian cities, but migration into the cities is 
putting a great deal of pressure on urban areas. For example, Ramallah is already 
confronted with an increasingly  limited supply of water and will struggle to meet the 
demands of a steadily increasing population. A taxi driver of almost forty years in the 
Palestinian Authority’s capital once described Ramallah to me as a “small box, with a 
large donkey  kicking inside it.”59  His analogy highlights the fact  that instead of 
growing and expanding, the urban center is actually swelling. An increasing 
population will only make the circumstances more difficult for the JWU utility to meet 
the demands of its consumers. Jericho, with its climate and unique historical and social 
significance, is also suffering increased water demand. Although Ein al-Sultan is an 
autonomous water source, it has not been allowed to develop or grow because of the 
restrictions that coincide with water infrastructure. Additionally, the municipality is 
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already allocating less of its water for agricultural purposes so that it can meet the 
domestic needs of the city. 
 The effects brought forth by  the lack of control on local water resources 
permeates all sectors, areas, and communities of the West Bank. A Palestinian program 
coordinator for an international donor agency explained that  water was needed in order 
for his community to grow. He said, “We have needs. We need water for industry and 
agriculture and domestic purposes. It’s not just  for drinking water, we need it for trees, 
food, we need it for development.”60  He illustrates the fact that the foundation for 
growth, sustainability, and progress in the West Bank is directly correlated to 
Palestinian access to their own water resources. Without it, the West Bank will regress, 
allowing power imbalances on the national level to persist. 
Migration Pressures on Palestinian Urban Centers 
 The issue of limited resources in the Jordan Valley  creates reason for 
Palestinians to migrate outward. As a result, Palestinians move from rural areas to live 
and work in urban centers, which creates considerable burden on the municipalities. 
The challenges of migration affect both Jericho and Ramallah Al-Bireh. However, 
because the latter has developed into Palestine's administrative, commercial, and 
cultural capital, it has attracted a significantly larger number of migrants from 
elsewhere in the West Bank.  The population  pressures from internal migration strain 
the cities’ public facilities, infrastructure, and their economies, while also heightening 
internal tensions. A writer from the Arab Thought Forum, an independent  Palestinian 
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organization specializing in local socioeconomic development, quoted a local 
Ramallah resident on his experiences with the increasing population:  
 This migration brought us nothing but more pressure on buildings, 
 services, and roads,” he said. “In Al-Tireh, where I live, you can find up to 200 
 people living in one 10-story building with 30 apartments.  They  all have their 
 own way of life and customs, and it’s hard to mix with them.61
 
 Under great population pressure, Ramallah faces a great deal of pressure on its 
public service facilities, as it has to continue providing space for the incoming 
communities. The local resident, quoted above, alludes to the increased likelihood of 
tensions within the city, due to an influx of individuals with contrasting cultural norms 
and social networks that are otherwise common to rural areas of the West Bank.  These 
factors create a situation that is impossible to sustain and contribute to a divisive 
environment between Palestinians themselves. 
 The number of buildings and apartments went from 115 in 2001 to 149 in 
2003, and the number of commercial centers doubled in 2003 compared to 2001.62  As 
conditions in the rural areas have not improved, it is safe to assume that these numbers 
will steadily increase. In order to meet growing needs, the municipality must pave 
roads, connect electricity, and provide water for the incoming people. 
 Economic burdens are an additional challenge for the municipalities. Ramallah 
Al-Bireh and Jericho both lack a self-sustaining economic base. Ramallah serves as 
the nerve center of a political system precariously reliant on donor money. Most of the 
money in its economy comes from the PA, the largest employer in the West Bank.63 
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The consequences to this dependency are apparent. With the shortfall in foreign aid 
and temporary Israeli-imposed financial sanctions, the West Bank government was 
forced to delay paying salaries several times during the past  year. Furthermore, the 
lack of space and need to develop  Ramallah’s infrastructure has caused property  prices 
to become exorbitantly high. Due to the large amount of international presence, the 
droves of diplomats and foreign NGO employees who flock to Ramallah with high 
salaries pay top-dollar rents, further fueling property prices.64  While landlords are 
enriched, the locals are resentful. Moreover, many landlords refuse even to rent their 
flats to poorer Palestinian locals.65  Combined with adversity between city locals and 
migrants, the challenges resulting from international presence create another layer of 
tensions within the city. 
	
 “All indications are pointing to this bubble bursting,”  commented an 
American-Palestinian activist from Ramallah Al-Bireh.  As a result of pressures on 
public services, infrastructure, and economy, Ramallah is swelling. With additional 
social problems, the deepening cleavages in Palestinian society exacerbate existing 
tensions. The formal job sector growth is also not enough to productively absorb the 
population coming into the cities, which in effect leads to increasing unemployment. 
The attempts to incorporate more employees into an already bloated system, with 
limited resources and weak institutions, will produce devastating results. 
! The case of Ramallah Al-Bireh signals the harder times ahead for urban centers 
if demographic trends continue. Migration at increasing rates could lead to a collapse 
in city  systems, given that they are already in a compromised position. Amid rising 
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internal divisions in the city, insufficient  public services, eroding trust  in Palestinian 
political parties, and poor economic conditions for both the PA and locals, urban 
centers may be plunging into a prolonged phase of ungovernability. 
Conclusion
 Palestinians in the Jordan Valley and urban centers are living a precarious 
existence. As land in the valley continues to decrease and farming becomes an 
increasingly impractical source of subsistence, the Palestinian agricultural sector will 
dry up slowly, leaving most Palestinian water sources allocated to the cities. As the 
farmers look to alternative means of livelihood in the cities, they are confronted with a 
situation that is equally insecure. 
 Palestinian cities have attracted a growing population, with people moving to 
urban centers from all across the territory. According to a World Bank report, the 
Palestinian economy has grown at an average of 7.7% a year between 2007 and 2011, 
most significantly centered in cities.66  However, as we have seen, this “growth”  is 
bellied by fragility, and much of the growth taking place is the result of generous 
international aid. But, sustainability cannot not be based upon foreign aid. As anxiety 
among the public increases due to internal challenges and inadequate public services, 
Ramallah, eventually, will likely be a failed system.
	
 Ungovernable conditions in the Palestinian urban centers serve to further 
undermine the peace process between Israel and the PA on a national scale, a process 
that has already been stuck for years. While autonomous areas are trapped in a cycle of 
perpetual failure and the government is unable to promote a resilient Palestinian 
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society, Palestinians are deemed incapable of being a genuine “partner in peace,” a 
claim that is frequently made by Israel. In his 2009 Bar Ilan speech, the current Prime 
Minister of Israel identified economic and social development in Palestine as the key 
to peace between the two sides. Prior to that, in 2008 as opposition leader, he told 
Israeli lawmakers, “We have seen this in the world, quickened economic and social 
development has helped form the conditions for peace and the resolution of conflict.” 67 
However, as we have seen,  the challenges that are experienced at the local level are in 
a cycle of perpetual failure, further impeding the capacities of Palestinians, both 
individuals and the collective. The inherent contradictions make one wonder: Is this by 
accident or by design? 
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CHAPTER VI
 CONCLUSION
 The stories in this thesis involved local water management in the West Bank. 
My  aim has been to focus on the processes and outcomes of challenges in the 
Palestinian water sector, challenges informed by  the real life struggles of people 
engaged with water provision on a daily  basis. First, by scaling down the analysis, the 
power structures and relations surrounding water governance are crystalized. Second, 
in a gradual progression, each empirical chapter shows the step-by-step  process in 
which local water supply problems aggravate the situation between Israel and the 
Palestinian Authority, on a national level. 
 In the Palestinian water sector, poor water supply  and antiquated water 
networks are primary, everyday concerns. Their shortcomings reinforce one another 
and political barriers prevent sustainable solutions. In order to promote cooperation 
over water between Israel and the Palestinian Authority, the Oslo peace process 
established institutions for water resource management. However, Oslo’s inequitable 
structure favors the existing power asymmetry, and politics continue to give shape to 
issues that are presumably technical in nature. 
 As a result  of technical failures and the weak position of their government, 
Palestinians have responded to the challenges in highly politicized and predictable 
ways. Their reactions further substantiate that  the three obstacles to integrated water 
management are political in nature. When Palestinians fail to pay their water bills at 
the household level, it leads to problems at the community level; in turn, the local 
government  is unable to generate revenue. As a consequence, the PWA is in debt to 
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Mekorot, a parastatal organization. Nonpayment contributes to tensions at a national 
level between Israel and the Palestinian Authority. This becomes a perpetual cycle: 
frustrated with poor water service, Palestinians refuse to pay their bills. Israel docks 
the PWA for the unpaid bills by taking money from the VAT revenue it  collects for 
Palestine. With reduced revenue, the PWA is less able to provide public services, 
increasing Palestinian frustrations with their own government. Rural to urban 
migration by  Palestinian farmers presents a similar cyclical challenge. While issues of 
inadequate water supply confront  rural Palestinian communities, urban centers are 
faced with migration pressures resulting from the increasing numbers of farmers 
leaving the Jordan Valley. The Palestinian cities’ are unable to sustain their increasing 
population. However, the challenges confronting farmers remain unresolved in the 
rural areas. Therefore, the issues of migration and urban pressures are perpetual. 
Although issues of water supply, infrastructure, and failed institutions are inherently 
political, they  are often recast in neutral language in order to propose solutions. The 
Palestinian reactions, however, call attention to the underlying power dynamics and 
highlight what is obscured by simplified, standardized, and static solutions. 
 As a result, Palestinian society is stuck in cycles of crisis that make the 
Palestinian Territories increasingly ungovernable. This continues to undermine the 
Palestinians’ role in the peace process. It  a rhetoric used time and time again to 
discount them in the negotiation process. It can be encapsulated as follows: How can 
Palestinians be in peace talks if they can’t govern themselves? Why should they be 
taken seriously as real partners in negotiating important  issues if they are unable to 
govern themselves? According to such claims, Palestinians cannot be “partners in 
peace,” as the Israeli prime minister frequently claims. 
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 The process shows how Israel continues to gather more control, through an 
intentional strategy  of contained asymmetry in the water sector. As James C. Scott 
stated, “The greater the power disparity  between dominant and subordinate, the more 
arbitrarily  it is exercised.”1  The more arbitrary the power, the more easily it can be 
veiled. Therefore, with power’s many masks, the conditions of vulnerable groups are 
exposed through the nuances. 
 The discourse surrounding water crisis in the Middle East highlights dominant 
invocations of state and restricts challenges in the water sector to the technical domain. 
It is particularly the case when water struggle is characterized by armed conflict or 
peaceful cooperation. A discourse of this kind is designed to find a solution to water 
conflict. While technocrats continue to focus on cooperation initiatives in the Middle 
East, they  obscure the complexities as well as the significance of power in shaping 
water conflict. 
 In attempts to counter the “water leads to war” thesis, solutions for the Israeli-
Palestinian water conflict are reduced to prescriptive and mechanical domains. 
Furthermore, by  concentrating on a violent notion of conflict at  the interstate scale, the 
exploitations that take place in more discursive ways, against nonstate actors, are 
neglected. Zeitoun makes an important point when he states that, in the Israeli-
Palestinian water struggle, ever increasing control of water is not actually possible; 
that  there are real limits to which physical control can be acquired.2 There are finite 
water resources upon which Israel can exert its control. However, it does not mean that 
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power, itself, is finite. Instead, that power permeates into all aspects of Palestinian life. 
Power becomes so thorough that it is almost impossible to tamper with.
 By rendering problems in the water sector as “technical,” the primary cause of 
failures is assumed to be Palestinian mismanagement. Institutions in the Palestinian 
government  are deemed corrupt and incapable. On the other hand, there is little 
incentive to fix institutions if society  is ungovernable. Institutions are made up of 
people and if Palestinian society  is in a cycle of crisis, there is little motivation to 
create transparent  and reliable institutions. Without this understanding, the solutions 
that  are implemented to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian water dispute create a gap 
between what is attempted and what is accomplished. The status quo is unchallenged 
and the problems do not match the solutions, resulting in a cycle of perpetual failure. 
  The local challenges of Palestinian civil society are obscured by the technical 
domain. Furthermore, the water struggle is a process of people, not states. These 
critiques are not dead, but as critical geographer Jennifer Hyndman rightfully claims, 
“they have ceased to serve conceptual or political interests.”3  Thus, it remains 
necessary to challenge state centered scales as pregiven and discrete from other levels 
of analysis. Rethinking scale of analysis has the potential to subvert dominant 
geopolitical narratives, actions that might have concrete effects on the lives of people, 
who are players in such events. This thesis has looked at processes to understand the 
outcomes. Furthermore, it shows that local insecurities are much more of a challenge 
because they are easily obscured, but have immense implications.
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